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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
This working paper forms part of the International Livestock Research Institute’s (ILRI’s) and Overseas 
Development Institute’s (ODI’s) ‘Process and Partnership for Pro-poor Policy Change’ (PPPPPC Project), 
which seeks to identify and institutionalise innovative research and development mechanisms and 
approaches that lead to pro-poor policy. The paper presents the results of the analysis of policy 
changes that occurred during and after the implementation of the Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP) in 
Kenya, a research and development (R&D) project which changed its focus towards achieving a greater 
impact from their findings on policy makers. It is a remarkable story of evidence-based policy making. 
The highly collaborative project was implemented by government institutions and an international 
research centre, later working together with advocacy Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). The high-
quality, credible and relevant research results pinpointed a basic problem in dairy development in 
Kenya: the need to recognise and develop the informal sector that markets the vast majority of milk in 
Kenya. Although the resulting changes in national policy are still in the legislative process, changes in 
attitude and behaviour of key actors toward the informal milk market can be observed from national 
level down to local level. 
Research framework and approach 
This case study reviewed the policy and institutional changes that occurred in the dairy sector during 
the lifetime of SDP and examined how and why these changes came about. The approach used is 
called the Research and Policy in Development Outcome Assessment (RAPID Outcome Assessment or 
ROA) which combines elements from three well established methodologies, namely: 
1. Episode studies of specific policy changes – tracking back from policy changes to identify key 
actors, events and influences, and assessing their relative importance.  
2. Case study analysis of specific research projects – tracking forwards from specific research and 
related activities to assess their impact. 
3. Outcome mapping approaches – identifying changes in behaviour of key actors and analysing what 
influenced these changes. 
 
Material was collected through: (i) literature review of project and external documentation, and close 
interaction with the SDP project team; (ii) a workshop with key SDP staff, collaborating partners and 
other key actors; (iii) individual interviews with key actors and dairy industry stakeholders at national, 
district and local levels to triangulate and clarify the workshop outputs; (iv) field visits to farmers, 
market agents and other key actors; and (v) a debriefing session with the project team to discuss initial 
case study findings. 
 
This information was assembled into five overlapping narratives: 
• A description of the key organisations and institutions directly involved with setting the policy 
framework or with SDP (see Section 3.1). 
• A general description of the evolution of the dairy sub-sector in Kenya over the last century (see 
Section 3.2). 
• A description of the evolution of policies affecting the sub-sector, and their implementation (the 
‘Episode Study’ component of the approach; see Section 3.3). 
• A description of what SDP did and why it did it (the ‘Case Study’ element of the approach; see 
Section 3.4). 
• A description of changes in behaviour of the key actors which contributed to the policy change, and 
the reasons for these. This corresponds to the ‘Outcome Mapping’ element of the ROA approach. 
Most of this is based on the results of the workshop triangulated with findings from the interviews 
(see Section 3.5).  
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Results: background, narratives and players 
Key actors 
Key actors in dairy sector policy in Kenya, and particularly those with relations to SDP, are:  
• Government departments and parastatals: Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development 
(MoLFD);1 Kenya Dairy Board (KDB); Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS); Ministry of Health (MoH). 
• Research organisations: Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI); International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI); National university departments, including Tegemeo Institute. 
• Private actors: Farmers; Consumers; Small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs); Milk processors/ 
packagers. 
• Civil society organisations (CSOs): Land O’Lakes; Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR); 
Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG); ActionAid Kenya; Strengthening Informal 
Sector Training and Enterprise (SITE). 
Historical context 
During the 1990s the Kenyan dairy industry was progressively liberalised starting with milk price 
decontrol in 1992. This process, together with problems of poor internal management and corruption, 
led to the gradual collapse of the state-owned Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) through the 1990s, 
effectively ending their 60-year monopoly on milk processing and marketing in the lucrative urban 
areas. This gap was quickly filled by a proliferation of unlicensed small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs) and 
large-scale, licensed and regulated private sector milk processors. The SSMVs sold raw milk whilst the 
private dairy companies sold packaged, pasteurised or UHT milk and other dairy products. Although 
sale of raw milk in urban areas was illegal, high consumer demand meant that the SSMVs serving 
various parts of Nairobi and other urban areas soon numbered tens of thousands. It was virtually 
impossible for the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) – the government-appointed body responsible for 
regulating the dairy industry – to control them, and the private dairy processors came to regard the 
SSMVs as unfair competition. 
 
The SSMVs provided a market outlet for the majority of smallholder dairy farmers. Most operated from 
fixed premises but some transported milk to urban centres by bicycle or public transport, usually in 
plastic containers. They mainly operated early in the morning in response to consumer demand, but 
also to avoid harassment by KDB inspectors.  
Political context: dairy policy in Kenya 
Until 1958, when the Dairy Industry Act (Cap. 336) was enacted, traditional milk marketing in Kenya had 
been largely unregulated. The Act, introduced mainly to protect the interests of large-scale settler dairy 
producers, still to a large extent regulates the dairy industry today, despite huge changes in the 
sector’s structure since then. In 1964, the Kibaki Commission on post-independence dairy development 
recommended abolishing contracted milk quotas in favour of access to KCC by all farmers, subject to 
their milk being of acceptable quality. KCC thus became a guaranteed market for raw milk, buying any 
amount of milk supplied, regardless of demand. However, by the early 1980s, the highly subsidised 
input services for dairy farmers had become unsustainable. Liberalisation of the dairy industry started 
in the mid-1980s, with full price decontrol by 1992. The entry into the market of new processors 
heralded the gradual collapse of KCC through the 1990s. The dairy industry from that time to the 
present has been dominated by small-scale production and marketing through SSMVs, yet in a policy 
environment that interpreted the informal market as illegal. Since 1995, the Government has been 
                                                        
1 The name of the ministry responsible for livestock in Kenya changed several times during the lifetime of the SDP project. 
Currently, in 2006, it is the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MoLFD), but previously it was known as the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD), and before that, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
Development (MALD) and then Ministry of Livestock Development (MoLD). Throughout this report, the ministry will be referred 
to as its most recent name – MoLFD. 
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trying to reform the legal and policy framework to reflect the way the industry had developed, although 
with little progress before the time SDP started in 1997. 
 
There were changes in the wider political context during SDP’s lifetime, particularly a change in 
government. New strategies were developed: a general Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation (ERS) in 2003, and a Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) in 2004. The SRA 
proposed far-reaching policy and institutional changes to reverse the decline of the agricultural sector 
and to position it competitively in the global arena. One proposed intervention was to bring all 
agriculture-related legislation under one apex Agriculture Act. 
 
More recently, there have been significant changes in implemented dairy policy, and progress towards 
change in the Dairy Policy and Dairy Bill. Following activities described later in this report, the Policy 
and Bill have been going through a revision process. The new Dairy Policy, presented for stakeholder 
consultation in April 2006, explicitly recognises the role of SSMVs, and includes measures to facilitate 
the transformation of the informal milk trade towards formalisation. These measures include 
development of appropriate technologies, training on safe milk handling, and provision of incentives 
for improved milk handling and establishment of a supportive milk dealer certification system. The 
Policy also states that KDB functions will be streamlined, self-regulation initiated and transition 
towards a stakeholder-managed institution initiated. 
 
The reforms have not yet been passed, and the supply of raw milk to scheduled areas is still technically 
illegal. However, a marked change in attitude and implementation has already taken place, particularly 
by KDB officials.  
 
Overall, these changes have been broadly in line with arguments that SDP and its partners had made 
throughout the project’s lifetime, and this policy change process is the main focus of this study. 
The SDP and policy change 
SDP was initiated in 1997 as a collaborative project between ILRI, KARI and the MoLFD, with funding 
from the UK Department for International Development (DFID). SDP was an integrated research and 
development initiative aimed at supporting the sustainable development of Kenya’s smallholder dairy 
sub-sector. It built on previous collaborative dairy research carried out by ILRI and KARI on the Kenya 
Coast. Key areas proposed for SDP research and development activities included detailed 
characterisations of the sector, from production to consumption, including the policy environment; and 
analysis of factors constraining competitiveness of smallholder dairy farmers and of social benefits of 
smallholder dairy production. There was also to be participatory development of improved technologies 
for farmers and traders, together with extension and training materials, and a spatial analysis of dairy 
systems for improved targeting. However, during its lifetime, the focus of the project shifted, in 
particular towards supporting change in the policy and institutional environment, in order to better 
support dairy dependent livelihoods. This paper presents a summary of the SDP log frames and a 
timeline of activities (including policy influencing) for the three phases of the project. 
SDP Phase I (1997-1999): Dairy research and development in Kenya 
During the first phase, the project focused on the development of ‘best-bet’ technologies to overcome 
farmers’ problems and to improve their livelihoods. SDP’s Rapid Appraisal (RA), completed in 1998, 
examined the dairy production systems, carried out an economic and structural analysis of dairying, 
and addressed policy and institutional issues related to dairy development in Kenya. This provided 
dairy stakeholders with a comprehensive overview of the situation at that time, and was the first major 
activity that placed the project in a position to influence policy. A key finding was the huge importance 
of the informal market (representing over 80% of marketed milk) for the livelihoods of producers, 
traders and consumers. These findings were presented at many meetings throughout SDP’s lifetime. 
However, towards the end of Phase I, it became obvious that many important aspects of dairy-related 
livelihoods were currently not being addressed. Following an in-depth review in January 1999, the focus 
of the project changed.  
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SDP Phase II (1999-2000): Change of focus 
Phase II of SDP attempted to develop the Phase I technologies further and also focused on the uptake 
of those technologies. Geographical coverage was extended, and the project’s new goal was 
‘Contribution to sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of poor people in Kenya’. Activities 
included a characterisation study of Western Kenya, and a detailed longitudinal survey of dairy 
production. This phase also saw the completion of the initial public health field activity. However, a 
‘snapshot review’ in 2000 reported favourably on SDP’s progress but recommended that because 
uptake of technologies at farm level was difficult in the prevailing policy environment, there was a need 
for SDP to develop a strategy for the reform of dairy policy and of research and knowledge services in 
order to increase impact. Soon after this review, the log frame was changed again, and Phase III of SDP 
began. 
SDP Phase III (2000-2005): Looking for impact 
Phase III saw more active engagement with policy. SDP formed a Policy Task Team, and drew up a 
strategy for policy influencing. Meanwhile, the public health research findings were presented at a 
stakeholder workshop on ‘Assessing and managing milk-borne health risks for the benefit of 
consumers in Kenya’. The findings were very controversial, but went on to be highly important. 
Following this workshop, a Dairy Public Health Committee (PHC) was convened by KDB and MoLFD, and 
included SDP. To tackle some of the informal market issues identified, SDP started piloting the training 
of SSMVs in basic milk testing, hygiene and handling.  
 
Part of SDP’s policy-influencing strategy was to foster links with CSOs that could bring capacity to 
engage in policy advocacy in a way that the SDP implementing institutions could not. The CSO partners 
were ActionAid Kenya, IPAR, ITDG, SITE and Land O’Lakes. In August 2003, an existing plan for SDP to 
hold a high-level Dairy Policy Forum was widened to include the CSOs as co-hosting partners. The 
purpose was to present SDP’s research results and to highlight the policy implications. Six policy briefs 
were prepared for this meeting (SDP, 2004a-f; SDP, 2005a-d), and a video commissioned.  
 
In December 2003, however, the Kenya Dairy Processors Association (KDPA), a coalition of milk 
processors and a packaging manufacturer, launched a high-profile ‘Safe Milk Campaign’ against the 
SSMVs. It was widely thought that their intention was to stamp out the SSMVs. With its negative 
portrayal of SSMVs as criminals, and the inaccuracy of the information released, the campaign was 
recognised by SDP and its CSO partners as being potentially extremely damaging to large numbers of 
poor peoples’ dairy-dependent livelihoods. The CSO partners held a press conference to contest this 
campaign, using SDP evidence to show that unsubstantiated health concerns were likely to reduce 
overall milk consumption, reduce health benefits to low income consumers and destroy hundreds of 
thousands of livelihoods. This started what became called the ‘Milk War’, with the newspapers full of 
debate on informal milk market issues. KDB and the processors repeatedly challenged the CSO 
partners’ statement, but were unable to produce evidence to back their claims, whilst the robust 
evidence from SDP strongly supported the CSOs’ arguments.  
 
At the Dairy Policy Forum in May 2004, all the SDP evidence was again presented. Farmers’ voices were 
very prominent at the Forum, especially through a farmer advocacy group. A video showed farmers, 
traders and poor consumers voicing their concerns, and made a significant impression. At the Forum, 
the Minister of Livestock gave a commitment to passing the stalled Dairy Bill, and to take account of 
the mass of evidence and stakeholder opinion presented.  
 
SDP finally finished as a project in March 2005. An additional set of Policy Briefs was launched, 
bringing the total number to 10.  
Behavioural change of key stakeholders and SDP’s role in this 
This section of the report focuses on behavioural changes that occurred among key actors. The 
participants at the ROA workshop listed key actors and identified changes that had occurred in their 
behaviour and attitude. It became evident that a clear change in practice and implementation of the 
laws had indeed occurred, together with a much wider change in perceptions and opinions on 
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development of the dairy industry in Kenya. These changes were further explored and triangulated in 
follow-up interviews.  
• KDB, the current regulator of the industry is now licensing many SSMVs and no longer harasses 
them as it did before. KDB is now collaborating with SITE to pilot the provision of business 
development services to SSMVs, linked with licensing. 
• MoLFD officials have also shown important changes in their attitude and behaviour, including 
support for the SSMVs. The Permanent Secretary personally triggered the recognition of SSMVs in 
the proposed Dairy Bill revision. 
• The private processors have now changed their marketing strategy to focus on the value and safety 
of processed, packaged milk, without overtly attacking SSMVs. Some processors are also 
encouraging SSMVs to trade in processed products. 
• Some SSMVs can now access training in basic milk testing, and have KDB licences. Many are 
starting to organise into groups to share costs, although the issue of the ‘voice’ of traders in the 
policy process remains a challenge.  
• Donor-funded activities in the sector are now more explicit about the role of the informal sector in 
dairy development. 
• Virtually all recent projects in the dairy sub-sector in Kenya have used SDP research results, and 
many have also linked with the SDP implementing institutions for new dairy related activities, both 
in service delivery and policy-related areas. 
Analysis and reflection 
The findings from this study were analysed using the RAPID framework, looking at political context, role 
of evidence, links and external influences.  
The policy context: politics, citizen voice and representation 
The changing political context post-2002, with a new government, provided space and opportunity for 
SDP’s more active policy influencing activities. The key role played by SDP’s civil society partners was 
possible because of changes in the role and activities of CSOs in Kenya, helped by the Constitutional 
Review process, which led to better channelling of citizen voice into policy processes. The CSOs were 
crucial partners in getting across policy messages from SDP research. As well as calling meetings with 
ministers, the high-profile advocacy and use of the media by the CSOs, together with their links to 
farmer advocacy groups, put increased pressure on the KDB for change.  
 
With the lack of representation of large sections of the dairy sector, especially small farmers, 
consumers and traders, the more powerful and better resourced players protected their interests, 
through their representation on the board of KDB. With such poor representation of larger but less 
powerful sections of the dairy sector on the board of KDB, it is not surprising that KDB had previously 
represented the interests of the formal sector players in preference to those of the more numerous 
informal sector stakeholders. New proposals to transform KDB into a truly representative, stakeholder-
run organisation, would, if they occur, significantly change this context of representation in the policy 
process, although there remain significant challenges to this occurring in practice.  
Evidence: relevance, credibility and communication 
Research evidence played a major role in changing attitudes and practices in the dairy sector, as it 
offered a wholly new paradigm of dairy market development. The evidence was wide-ranging, relevant, 
highly robust and credible, making it difficult for opponents to refute. It was strategically and 
innovatively communicated to a range of audiences. From the initial emphasis on milk production, the 
direction of the research changed to focus on key constraints identified, relating this to people’s 
livelihoods, whilst technical research on controlling public health risks continued. The research was 
seen as highly credible, coming from major public research institutions. As well as the conventional 
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research, the participatory approaches used with the SSMVs meant that resulting training guidelines 
and milk cans were highly appropriate. This evidence also showed clear ways forward for policy 
makers. The SDP researchers were careful to maintain the credibility of their evidence, in marked 
contrast to ‘evidence’ presented by opponents during the Safe Milk Campaign, apparently intended to 
frighten consumers: evidence that could not be substantiated.  
 
SDP used diverse communication approaches, including conventional meetings and workshops, the 
media, and specific targeting of policy makers with policy briefs and through the advocacy activities of 
SDP’s partners. SDP’s collaborative nature also ensured continuous communication of evidence to key 
stakeholders through their direct involvement with SDP. This long-term communication was very 
important, so that what was initially considered as almost heretical became more widely accepted, if 
still controversial. Later, specific communication with policy makers was conducted through meetings 
and use of policy briefs, together with a video produced for the Dairy Policy Forum. SDP’s CSO partners 
played a key role in this high-level communication, being able to engage in more overt advocacy, using 
a variety of channels. Use of the media was also important, especially at the time of the Milk War. 
Links 
The collaboration between MoLFD, KARI and ILRI was based on several years of previous collaboration. 
Each brought different capacities and trusted the other partners to carry out their respective roles. 
Throughout the project, the project manager was a MoLFD official, intimately involved with policy 
making processes, sitting on drafting committees and in close contact with peers responsible for 
leading these processes. All the major stakeholders were represented on the SDP steering committee, 
and wider collaboration brought new partners in, adding to the credibility of the evidence. SDP worked 
closely with key organisations seen as targets for change, especially the KDB.  
 
SDP’s links with advocacy partners proved very effective. They required a lot of work to establish and 
maintain, but through their shared vision of improved livelihoods for the poor, the coalition of very 
different organisations worked very effectively. However, it was clear that SDP’s resources, including 
the work of a coordinator within SDP, were important in maintaining this collaboration. 
External influences 
DFID’s shift to focus on Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches in the mid-1990s, followed by the 
emphasis on policies, institutions and processes affecting livelihoods, was an important influence on 
SDP. But in addition, the subsequent success in SDP’s policy influencing activities meant that lessons 
were fed back to DFID – lessons that included the importance of robust livelihoods-relevant evidence in 
controversial policy debates. SDP is widely quoted within DFID as a success story in influencing policy, 
and it is not unreasonable to assume that lessons have been taken on board within DFID. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, some lessons can be drawn on improving pro-poor policy outcomes: 
• Collaboration: Good collaboration was a major factor in the success of SDP in achieving policy 
change, but this rested on years of previous collaboration. Such effective working partnerships take 
time and effort to establish, and rely on understanding and trust between partners. Collaborative 
approaches to research, linking with other organisations and use of participatory approaches, not 
only improves relevance of findings, but enhances ongoing communication. 
• From research to policy: Wide-ranging, highly robust and relevant evidence can be very powerful 
in influencing policy change. Reputable research institutions collaborating together add to the 
credibility of evidence. It is doubtful whether the evidence would be as rigorous and thorough if 
SDP had not started as an R&D project or whether it would have been able to achieve policy change 
if it had been initially set up as an advocacy project.  
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• A forum for the dairy industry: SDP took every opportunity to take part in meetings to 
communicate evidence. Representatives of key stakeholders on the project Steering Committee 
enabled continuous communication of evidence. And once respect was established, SDP was 
asked to sit on influential working groups. Key issues were raised with policy makers, at project 
workshops and the Dairy policy Forum. The ability of empowered farmers and SSMVs to speak in 
person at the Dairy Policy Forum proved to be a compelling factor in successfully changing 
opinions.  
• Working with CSOs: The linkage with CSOs in advocating for policy change was crucial, both in 
opening more channels for influencing and in providing a link to grassroots organisations. Research 
organisations and CSOs are quite different organisations, but maintaining a shared vision enabled 
effective collaboration. However, such linkages are very demanding of time, and retaining a person 
to focus on policy advocacy work was a great advantage.  
• Multiple approaches: SDP was able to work with stakeholders at all levels in the dairy industry, 
from small-scale farmers and traders, up to policy makers. This opened multiple channels for 
influencing, further enhanced by the CSO links. Different channels are effective at different times, 
and a variety of communication methods need to be used effectively for different targets. Such 
multiple approaches appear to be helpful in influencing policy change. 
• Importance of individuals: Individuals can play crucial roles both as proponents and opponents 
of change. Well-placed individuals acting as policy champions, able to draw on broader 
collaborative networks, and feeding into decision-making processes, can be hugely influential. 
Conversely, influential individuals blocking change require alternative approaches to convince or 
bypass them. 
• Right timing: SDP took advantage of the changing political context in Kenya, including the role of 
civil society and increased citizen voice. But planning and being ready to take advantage of such 
opportunities as they occur is important. The years of continually feeding in evidence proved highly 
important before more overt policy-influencing activities. Active advocacy for change much earlier 
than it was done may have met with a different outcome.  
• External factors: External support can be helpful. As DFID focused more on policy-level changes, 
and on ‘policies, institutions and processes’, they gave theoretical and practical support for SDP 
staff to do the same.  
• Focus on incentives: Politicians’ responses may depend on personal political gain as much as on 
evidence itself. Demonstrating the ‘popular interest’ value of changes influenced the politicians, 
whilst KDB’s change in attitude meant they could be seen as pioneers of a new model for a dairy 
industry, rather than appearing to side with the formal sector. Looking at how a policy change 
affects key people’s personal interests, and adapting a strategy to account for this, is therefore 
important. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 ILRI’s Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change Project 
This working paper forms part of the International Livestock Research Institute’s (ILRI’s) and Overseas 
Development Institute’s (ODI’s) ‘Process and Partnership for Pro-poor Policy Change’ (PPPPPC) Project, 
which seeks to identify and institutionalise innovative research and development mechanisms and 
approaches that lead to pro-poor policy. The project is a response to the need to better understand the 
processes and mechanisms that lead to pro-poor decisions at the policy level, and aims to provide 
recommendations to improve the impact of work by ILRI and its partners. 
 
In collaborating with ILRI researchers to develop new learning methodologies for use in the PPPPPC 
Project, ODI have built on considerable experience gained through their Research and Policy in 
Development (RAPID) Programme (see http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid). RAPID aims to improve the use of 
research and evidence in development policy and practice and has four main themes: 
• The use of evidence in policy identification, development and implementation; 
• Improving communication and information systems for development agencies; 
• Better knowledge management to enhance the impact of development agencies; 
• Promotion and capacity building for evidence-based policy. 
 
The first and last themes are particularly relevant to the PPPPPC Project, which involves carrying out 
and analysing three case studies in Eastern Africa, each focusing on specific areas of policy change.  
 
This working paper covers the first of the three case studies and focuses on the smallholder dairy 
sector in Kenya. It presents the results of the analysis of policy changes that occurred during the 
Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP) in Kenya, which ran from August 1997 until March 2005.  
1.2 Case study: the Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP) in Kenya 
During the 1990s the Kenyan dairy industry was progressively liberalised, starting with milk price 
decontrol in 1992. This process, together with problems of poor internal management and corruption, 
led to the collapse of the state-owned Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) through the 1990s. This 
effectively ended the KCC’s 60-year monopoly on milk processing and marketing in the lucrative, high-
demand urban areas of Kenya – a gap that was quickly filled by (i) a proliferation of small-scale, illegal, 
informal milk traders and (ii) large-scale, licensed and regulated, private sector milk processors and 
packers. The small-scale traders sold raw milk whilst the private dairy companies sold packaged, 
pasteurised or UHT milk and other dairy products. Although the sale of raw milk in urban areas was 
illegal, high consumer demand for raw milk meant that the number of small-scale milk vendors 
(SSMVs) serving various parts of Nairobi and other urban areas in Kenya soon reached tens of 
thousands. It became virtually impossible for the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) – the government-appointed 
body responsible for regulating the dairy industry – to control them, and the private dairy companies 
came to regard the untaxed, unregulated and unlicensed SSMVs as unfair competition.  
 
The SSMVs bought milk from smallholder dairy farmers. Most operated from fixed premises but some 
were mobile. Plastic containers were predominantly used and the raw milk was transported by bicycle 
or public transport to urban centres. Most of the traders delivered to specific customers but some also 
retailed milk in the open market. The milk traders had good networks amongst themselves and mainly 
operated early in the morning, partly in response to demand from consumers but also to avoid 
harassment by KDB inspectors.  
 
This was the situation when the Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP) was initiated in 1997. The SDP was a 
collaborative project led by the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MoLFD) in 
collaboration with ILRI and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), with funding from the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID). The SDP was an integrated research and 
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development initiative aimed at supporting the sustainable development of Kenya’s smallholder dairy 
sub-sector. The project built on previous collaborative dairy research carried out by ILRI and KARI on the 
Kenya Coast (Muriuki, 2005) and was intended to extend this work to the highlands areas, where most 
dairy cattle were kept, and to include both the formal and informal systems supplying milk to Nairobi.  
1.3 Outline of the working paper 
This working paper first describes the methodology developed and used in the SDP case study. It goes 
on to review the policy and institutional changes that occurred in the dairy sector during the lifetime of 
the SDP and describes how and why these changes came about. This includes an analysis of the 
impacts of the SDP and its partners on the behaviour and attitudes of a range of stakeholders which 
eventually led to changes in policy. Finally, lessons learned are drawn out regarding both the 
methodology used for the case study and the factors that enabled SDP and its partners to achieve 
impact on policy. 
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2 Research Framework and Approach 
Evaluating the impact of research on policy and practice is extremely difficult. An enormous range of 
different factors influence most policy processes, waxing and waning and in different combinations 
over time. Attributing causality to specific factors is problematic, as different approaches tend to 
emphasise different sets of factors. ODI’s RAPID programme has been working to improve the use of 
research and evidence in development policy and practice for a number of years and is developing an 
approach which combines elements from three well-established methodologies, namely: 
• Episode studies of specific policy changes – tracking back from policy changes to identify key 
actors and decisions and assessing the relative importance of different factors, which might have 
included research-based evidence (the approach used by ODI, see http://www.odi.org.uk 
/RAPID/Publications). This approach tends to emphasise political factors and underemphasise the 
role of research.  
• Case study analysis of specific research projects – tracking forwards from specific research and 
related activities implemented by specific projects to assess the impact they had (the IFPRI 
approach, see http://www.ifpri.org/impact/iadp02.pdf). This approach tends to overemphasise 
the importance of research. 
• Outcome mapping – identifying changes in behaviour and analysing what was done or happened to 
bring them about (the Outcome Mapping approach developed by IDRC, see http://web.idrc.ca 
/en/ev-64698-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html). 
 
This was further refined for the SDP case study into an approach called the Research and Policy in 
Development Outcome Assessment (RAPID Outcome Assessment or ROA). The ROA approach aims to 
triangulate information collected, using a combination of all three approaches to obtain a more 
balanced assessment of the relative contribution of a project or programme’s actions and research on 
changes in policy or the policy environment, which will inevitably also have been influenced by a 
number of other factors.2  
 
A wide range of approaches were used to collect information for the ROA of the SDP case study: 
1. A literature review of relevant project and external documentation; 
2. Briefings, regular meetings and close interaction with the SDP project team during which, inter alia, 
key actors and boundary partners were identified; 
3. A workshop with key project staff, SDP project stakeholders (who are called Boundary Partners in 
Outcome Mapping) and other people who had been involved in the dairy sector in Kenya, but not 
closely involved in the project. The workshop3 included sessions designed to: 
a. develop a timeline describing the key events prior to, during and after the policy change; 
b. identify the behaviour of project boundary partners before, during and after the project, and 
the events and other factors that influenced behaviour changes; 
c. identify any events external to the key dairy sector actors that influenced policy change; 
d. establish cause and effect between various key events; 
e. identify further issues for triangulation and clarification through follow-up interviews. 
4. Individual discussions with various key actors, boundary partners and stakeholders of the SDP 
project at national, district and village levels to triangulate and clarify the outputs from the 
workshop; 
5. Field visits with smallholder farmers, SSMVs, District Council Public Health Officers and Livestock 
Officers, KDB inspectors at district level and their staff, and other milk marketers; 
6. A debriefing session with the project team to discuss preliminary findings of the case study. 
 
                                                        
2 The advantages and disadvantages of each approach and a detailed description of ROA is provided in the participant 
handout of the methodology workshop held at the start of the SDP case study, and is available at: 
http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Meetings/ILRI_workshops/Methodology_workshop.html. 
3 A detailed description of the approach used and the results of the policy impact workshop are available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Meetings/ILRI_workshops/Policy_impact_workshop.html. 
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The information collected through these methods was then assembled into five overlapping narratives 
each with a slightly different perspective: 
1. A description of the key organisations and institutions directly involved in it or involved in setting 
the policy framework (see Section 3.1). 
2. A general description of the evolution of milk production, processing and marketing in Kenya over 
the last century (see Section 3.2). 
3. A description of the evolution of policies affecting the dairy industry in Kenya and their 
implementation. This is essentially the ‘Episode Study’ of the ROA approach – a narrative tracking 
back from the Dairy Bill and aiming to identify the factors which influenced its development. It 
proved extremely difficult to do this for a number of reasons, including the difficulty of meeting the 
most senior policy makers who had been involved and the fact that many of the informants had 
been very closely involved in the project itself (see Section 3.3). 
4. A description of what the project did and why it did it. This corresponds to the ‘Case Study’ element 
of the ROA approach (see Section 3.4). 
5. A description of changes in behaviour of the key actors which contributed to decisions or actions 
leading to the policy change, and the reasons for these, including the role of SDP. This corresponds 
to the ‘Outcome Mapping’ element of the ROA approach. Most of this is based on the results of the 
workshop triangulated with findings from the interviews (see Section 3.5).  
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3 Results: Background, Narratives and Players 
3.1 Key actors 
The key actors listed here are a combination of actors mentioned in review documents as key to the 
development of Kenya’s dairy sector, and a list from a brainstorming and ranking session in the 
workshop where the participants were asked to list actors who were key to policy change in the dairy 
sector (see section 3.5.1). We present a combined list in Table 1, and then describe each actor in more 
detail in this section. As this report focuses on SDP’s role in policy changes, the relationship of the 
actors to SDP is indicated.  
 
Table 1: Key actors in dairy sector policy in Kenya 
Actor Relationship to SDP 
Government departments and parastatals  
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries  
Development (MoLFD)4 
SDP implementing organisation 
Sat on SDP Steering Committee 
Also target for influencing5  
Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) Sat on SDP Steering Committee 
SDP target for influencing  
Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) Sat on SDP Steering Committee6 
SDP target for influencing  
Ministry of Health (MoH) Sat on SDP Steering Committee  
SDP target for influencing  
Research organisations  
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute SDP implementing organisation 
International Livestock Research Institute SDP implementing organisation 
National Agricultural University Departments SDP research partners 
Private actors  
Farmers  
Consumers  
Small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs) SDP target for influencing 
Milk processors/packagers SDP target for influencing  
Sat on SDP Steering Committee (through Kenya 
Dairy Processors Association) 
Civil society organisations (CSOs)  
Land O’Lakes, Kenya SDP research partner 
Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) SDP advocacy partner 
Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG)7 SDP advocacy partner 
ActionAid Kenya SDP advocacy partner 
Strengthening Informal Sector Training and Enterprise (SITE) SDP advocacy partner 
 
                                                        
4 See footnote 1 on MoLFD. 
5 MoLFD, KDB, KEBS, MoH and other organisations became targets for influencing as the focus of SDP changed to include 
policy advocacy. However their relationship to SDP as members of the Project Steering Committee was there from the start of 
the project and continued throughout its lifetime. 
6 SDP also had influence through the KEBS Committee on Dairy Standards (See Section 3.1.1). 
7 Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) has recently changed its name to ‘Practical Action’. 
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3.1.1 Government departments and parastatals 
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MoLFD)8 
MoLFD is a Kenyan government ministry responsible for developing the dairy industry for the country. 
Beside dairy, the ministry is also responsible for the development of livestock as a whole (including 
Range Development and Management; Veterinary Services and Disease Control; Livestock Production 
and Extension Services; Meat Inspection and Development of Abattoirs), fisheries (Inland and Marine 
Fisheries) and sylviculture (bee-keeping industry). SDP was planned to be a MoLFD project, and the 
project manager was a member of ministry staff. This position of SDP Project Manager was held by the 
same person continuously from the beginning of the project in 1997 until 2004 when he retired and was 
replaced by somebody from the same office. Holding the position of Assistant Director of Animal 
Production, the project manager sat on various boards and committees within the ministry. This meant 
that findings from SDP were continually fed into the formal policy process throughout the lifetime of the 
project. The Director of Livestock Production (DLP) was the Chairman of the SDP Steering Committee. 
Whilst initially reporting directly to the Permanent Secretary (PS), in 1998 incorporation into the 
Ministry of Agriculture created a gap between the Director of Livestock’s new position9 and the PS, as 
protocol required reporting through the Director of Agriculture for any SDP-related issues. The situation 
was reversed in 2003 when the office of DLP was re-instated. Two different people held the position of 
DLP during SDP’s lifetime. 
 
Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) 
The Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) was established under Section 4 of the Dairy Industry Act (Cap. 336) 
enacted by an Act of Parliament in 1958. It is from this Act that the Board derives its power and 
functions. KDB is responsible for regulating, promoting and developing the dairy industry either by 
itself or in association with others, in pursuance of Section 17 of the Dairy Industry Act. The Board is 
responsible for: 
• Organisation, regulation and development of efficient production, marketing distribution and 
supply of dairy produce for different classes of consumers; 
• Licensing of milk producers and processors whilst permitting the greatest possible degree of 
private enterprise in the industry; 
• Maintenance of quality and milk hygiene in dairy products through training of farmers and traders; 
• Encouraging proper use of containers, storage facilities, packaging and other materials for milk and 
milk products; 
• Regulation of domestic sales and importation of dairy produce; 
• Promotion of consumption of quality milk and milk products; 
• Enforcement of the Dairy Industry Act. 
 
The Board is currently managed by a Board of Directors with a Chairman appointed by the Minister in 
charge of Livestock – from the recommendations of the Central Agricultural Board. Nominees are 
appointed from selections at District Agricultural Committees, Provincial Agricultural Boards and the 
Central Agricultural Board. The Managing Director (MD) is responsible for the day to day running of the 
Board. The KDB MD sat on the SDP Steering Committee, although the position of MD changed during 
SDP’s lifetime, and the new MD was initially rather less informed about SDP and its activities than his 
predecessor.  
 
Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) 
The Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) provides the dairy sector with relevant standards and codes of 
practice on production and marketing of milk, and provides training for public sector staff. Such 
standards are usually based on international standards, including the Codex Alimentarius,10 although 
national standard setting bodies such as KEBS are entitled to align such standards to local conditions.  
                                                        
8 See footnote 1 on MoLFD. 
9 In the combined Ministry, the DLP became the Senior Deputy Director of Livestock Production. 
10 The Codex Alimentarius is the set of standards, guidelines and codes of practice agreed by the FAO and WHO for the 
protection of consumer health and maintenance of fair trade practices in the food trade. It promotes coordination of all food 
standards work undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organisations. 
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A representative from KEBS sat on the SDP Steering Committee. In addition, the SDP Project Manager 
sat on the KEBS Committee on Dairy Standards (in his capacity as Assistant Director of Animal 
Production at the MoLFD). 
 
Ministry of Health (MoH) 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) is charged with the responsibility of providing quality health care for all 
citizens of Kenya so that they may lead economically and socially productive lives. In relation to the 
dairy sector, MoH’s function was to perform health inspections and other public health services. A 
separate section of the MoH deals with nutrition, and is little involved in the dairy sector. District Public 
Health Officers are responsible for certification of milk traders. The Chief of the Public Health Division of 
the MoH sat on the SDP Steering Committee.  
3.1.2 Research organisations 
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI)  
The Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) is a parastatal government institution responsible for 
bringing together research programmes on food crops, horticultural and industrial crops, livestock and 
range management, land and water management, and socio-economic issues. KARI promotes sound 
agricultural research, technology generation and dissemination to ensure food security through 
improved productivity and environmental conservation. KARI’s mission is to develop and disseminate 
appropriate agricultural technologies in collaboration with stakeholders. KARI further contributes to the 
sustainable improvement in the livelihoods of Kenyan citizens by increasing agricultural productivity, 
post-harvest value of agricultural and livestock products, and conserving the environment. SDP’s 
Assistant Project Manager was from KARI, and the person holding this position changed once, in early 
2001. The institute was also represented on the SDP Steering Committee by the Assistant Director 
(Animal Production), who was the Vice Chairman of this Committee throughout the lifetime of SDP.11  
 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) 
The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) belongs to the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR). This association of more than 50 governments and public- and private-
sector institutions supports a network of 15 Future Harvest Agricultural Research Centres working to 
reduce poverty, hunger and environmental degradation in developing countries. ILRI’s aim is to give 
poor people in developing countries strategic options they can use to transform their subsistence 
livelihoods into sustainable and market-oriented livestock enterprises. ILRI had been carrying out 
research into dairy systems for a number of years in different countries before the SDP collaboration 
started. ILRI was represented in the SDP project management team by the Field Manager/Technical 
Adviser. Once again, there was a change in personnel during the project, in early 2002. ILRI was also 
responsible for the financial aspects of the SDP project. 
 
National Agricultural Universities 
National university departments, especially Nairobi University and Egerton University, have for a long 
time carried out research into various aspects of dairy production, marketing and policy. SDP 
collaborated with universities in various activities, particularly in some of the public health research. 
Tegemeo Institute of Egerton University has carried out much research into dairy sector policy issues, 
some of it drawing on SDP outputs. They are also closely involved in ongoing revisions of national dairy 
policy. 
3.1.3 Private actors 
Farmers 
Smallholder dairy farmers with improved breeds are responsible for the vast majority of milk produced 
for market in Kenya. There are estimated to be over 600,000 such smallholder dairy households, which 
                                                        
11 Towards the end of the project, the Assistant Director (Animal Production) was promoted to Deputy Director of KARI. The SDP 
Assistant Project Manager replaced him as Assistant Director (Animal Production). Nevertheless, both continued to carry out 
their respective functions as SDP Assistant Project Manager and Vice Chairman of the Steering Committee until the end of the 
project. 
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in addition to family labour, also provide employment to some 350,000 full-time farm labourers. Whilst 
many are members of Dairy Co-operatives, they are in general poorly organised to advocate for their 
concerns. Larger-scale farmers represent only a small proportion of Kenya’s dairy farmers, but they are 
highly represented on the KDB, and closely linked to larger processors and their interests. 
 
Farmers’ groups 
A variety of dairy co-operatives and self-help groups exist for dairy farmers, usually focused on 
accessing market outlets and input supplies and services. Farmer advocacy groups exist, but many 
seem to have limited connection with the majority of smallholder farmers. However in recent years, 
some have developed, supported by NGOs, to be able to more effectively advocate for the real needs of 
smallholder farmers. The Kenya National Farmers Union (now Kenya Federation of Agricultural 
Producers – KENFAP) and the Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives (KNFC) sat on the SDP 
Steering Committee. 
 
Consumers 
Consumers are clearly the raison d’être of the dairy industry. Their demand patterns and purchasing 
power have shaped the production and market systems, along with other factors. However, there is no 
effective organisation or body to represent concerns of consumers, especially poor consumers, and 
they were not significantly represented in the policy process. 
 
Small-Scale Milk Vendors 
The SSMVs, who rapidly proliferated in number in the post-liberalisation dairy industry, now dominate 
the sale of milk in both rural and urban areas. The exact number of SSMVs is not officially regulated, 
but according to SDP estimates the number was approximately 40,000. Some SSMVs have organised 
themselves into informal groups or self-help groups to share costs and exchange information about the 
milk market on a daily basis. Less than 1% are certified by the KDB or trained in basic milk hygiene and 
milk handling.  
 
Milk processors/packagers 
Following liberalisation, the formal milk processors/packagers only contribute approximately 14% of 
total milk sold in Kenya, the remainder being marketed by the informal sector. Both formal and informal 
sectors source their milk predominantly from smallholder dairy farmers. There are 34 companies 
registered at the KDB, processing around 600,000 litres per day (only some 35% of the total installed 
capacity, which is over 2 million litres per day). The Kenya Dairy Processors Association (KDPA) 
represents interests of the private processors, and a member sat on the SDP Steering Committee. 
3.1.4 Civil society organisations 
At the workshop, advocacy CSOs were identified as important actors in the policy process, although 
these were not necessarily those most actively involved as dairy industry stakeholders. A variety of 
CSOs work with sector stakeholders, mainly in supporting farmer groups for service delivery 
(supporting improved production or marketing of milk). Those more involved in advocacy have 
generally become involved in dairy policy because they see the way current policies constrain 
development and adversely affect livelihoods. 
 
Land O’Lakes, Kenya 
Land O’Lakes, Kenya is the ‘development arm’ of a large US-based dairy co-operative. In partnership 
with African Breeders Service, Total Cattle Management, World Wide Sires and ILRI, Land O’Lakes is 
implementing the USAID-funded Kenya Dairy Development Programme (KDDP), which aims to 
significantly increase the economic benefits to stakeholders in the farm-to-market dairy value chain, 
through increasing demand and improving efficiency. There is also a policy component. The 
programme, funded by USAID, was initiated in 2003 and will run until 2007. SDP represented 
significant matching funds in the first two years of the project and some SDP initiatives were continued 
into the second two years.  
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Advocacy-focused CSOs: 
 
The Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) 
IPAR was established in 1994 as an independent, indigenous and non-partisan private organisation. It 
is a non-profit body whose primary goal is to pursue quality research-based public policy analysis and 
to generate non-partisan discussion focused on Kenya and the region. Through these activities, IPAR is 
often closely involved in policy making processes, being asked by government or parliamentarians to 
advise in various areas. IPAR was one of SDP’s advocacy partners in the later stages of the project. 
 
Intermediate Technology Development Group – East Africa (ITDG-EA) 
ITDG-EA has a mission to help eradicate poverty in developing countries through the development and 
use of technology, demonstrating results, sharing knowledge and influencing others. Through its 
Regional Director, ITDG had good links to Ministers and other decision-makers. ITDG was one of SDP’s 
advocacy partners in the later stages of the project. 
 
ActionAid Kenya  
ActionAid Kenya has been working in Kenya since 1972 to facilitate processes that eradicate poverty 
and ensure social justice through anti-poverty projects, local institutional capability building and 
public policy influencing. The organisation supports projects and programmes that promote the 
interests of poor and marginalised people. ActionAid Kenya has evolved over the years from a service 
delivery organisation to one that is primarily concerned with the promotion and defence of economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political human rights. ActionAid was one of SDP’s advocacy partners in the 
later stages of the project. 
 
Strengthening Informal Sector Training and Enterprise (SITE) 
SITE works in different informal sectors providing business development services to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) based on implementation, research and consulting. It also gets involved in 
advocacy where there is a need for policy change to support enterprise development. Currently, SITE 
manages a DFID funded dairy project to develop SMEs from the informal market through development 
of business development services. This two year project, in partnership with KDB, SSMVs and ILRI, will 
finish in 2006 . SITE was one of SDP’s advocacy partners in the later stages of the project. 
3.2 Historical context: evolution of the Kenya dairy industry 
Kenya has more dairy cattle than any other country in Africa; over three million crossbred and grade 
cows, which is more than the combined total of the rest of Eastern and Southern Africa, including South 
Africa. Kenyan milk consumption is also the highest of any developing country, averaging 80 to 100 
litres per person per year, and most milk in Kenya is now produced on smallholder’s farms. 
 
The modern dairy industry in Kenya can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, with the 
introduction of exotic dairy breeds by European settlers and subsequent upgrading of local zebu cattle 
through crossbreeding. For the first 60 years, the Kenyan dairy industry was dominated by large-scale 
settlers. Until the 1950s, indigenous Kenyans were not permitted to engage in commercial agricultural 
activities, although in rural and pastoral areas smallholders kept cattle and consumed the milk they 
produced or sold the surplus to their neighbours. By the 1920s, commercial dairying had taken off and 
the state-owned Kenya Co-operative Creameries Limited (KCC) was founded in 1925. KCC enjoyed a 
monopoly on the collection, processing and marketing of milk in urban areas for the next 60 years.  
 
In 1954, the Swynnerton Plan for Intensification of African Agriculture allowed indigenous Kenyans to 
engage in commercial farming for the first time (Swynnerton, 1954). Independence, in 1963, further 
boosted efforts to increase the welfare of the people and achieve more equitable distribution of the 
nation’s resources. Sessional Paper No. 10 (Government of Kenya, 1965) on African Socialism and its 
application to development planning in Kenya is an early example of a policy document driving change.  
 
At independence many of the settlers left, with their cattle abandoned or redistributed to indigenous 
Kenyans (Muriuki et al., 2003) and land previously controlled by settlers was subdivided and 
redistributed in line with the land reform movement. This process started the shift from a dairy industry 
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dominated by large-scale producers to one dominated by smallholders. In 1964, the Government 
followed the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry on dairy development (the Kibaki 
Commission), which included abolition of contracted milk quotas and opening up of KCC to all farmers 
so long as milk was of acceptable quality. KCC became a guaranteed market to all for raw milk, and 
embarked on a rapid expansion programme, with government guaranteed loans, throughout the 1970s 
and early 1980s. KCC enjoyed official monopoly access to a protected urban market,12 with raw milk 
sales relatively insignificant in the main Nairobi market. 
 
The Government began to invest in the dairy sector by providing highly subsidised input services for 
breeding, animal health and production, and through the deployment of animal health and production 
officers to areas of medium and high potential to provide services and advice to farmers. The 
combination of these measures resulted in a significant increase in milk production: total milk 
production in Kenya in 1971 was estimated to be around 1 billion litres (World Bank, 1989), increasing 
to 2.4 billion litres by 1997 (FAO, 2002). 
 
By 1977, the smallholders had overtaken the large-scale dairy farmers to become the major producers 
of milk in Kenya (Mbogoh and Ochuonyo, 1992), but in marketing, the KCC still dominated the picture. 
However, instead of collecting milk just from big producers as previously, the KCC had expanded its 
cooling plant network to serve the growing number of smallholder dairy farmers. KCC’s major role was 
to receive, process and distribute fresh pasteurised milk but they also produced UHT milk and other 
processed milk products including sour milk (mala), butter, cheese, ghee, cream and yoghurt, 
producing 1 billion half-litre cartons of milk annually at the beginning of the 1990s (TetraPak, pers. 
comm., 2005). The licensing of the Meru Central Farmers Co-operatives Union (MCFCU) in 1983 and the 
Kitinda Dairy Farmers Co-operatives Society (KDFCS) in 1986 as dairy processors ended KCC’s 
monopoly on formal milk processing and marketing in the scheduled urban areas.  
 
The Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth paved the way for 
liberalisation of the sector, with specific policy actions including price decontrols, liberalisation of 
marketing, government budget rationalisation, privatisation and parastatal reform. KCC was suffering 
from being used as a development organisation without any planned exit strategy, and later from 
political interference and corruption. Liberalisation of the dairy sector, including milk price decontrol in 
1992, combined with KCC’s inefficiency and mismanagement, led to KCC’s gradual collapse later in the 
1990s, leaving a processing and marketing gap.  
 
This gap was quickly filled. Whilst much raw milk was still sold directly by farmers to rural consumers, 
SSMVs proliferated rapidly, finding a ready market for raw milk: consumers liked it because it was 
cheaper than processed milk and most preferred the taste. These SSMVs operated from milk-bars, 
kiosks or as mobile traders, using bicycles or public transport. They were very suspicious of authorities 
as they had neither licences nor channels to pay cess,13 and used many means to survive and evade 
control, including paying bribes to avoid being arrested when caught illegally selling milk in the 
scheduled areas.  
 
Large-scale commercial processors took a much smaller proportion of the former KCC market in the 
urban areas. The reasons for this are complex but an important factor was undoubtedly that relatively 
few urban consumers could afford to buy milk at the price at which the major processors could sell. The 
advantages enjoyed by KCC, such as a market monopoly, considerable economies of scale and 
government subsidies, were not enjoyed by the new private sector dairy companies. One result of this 
is that the number of private processors initially rose rapidly and then fell back, stabilising in a 
situation with a handful of the largest companies controlling most of the processed milk market, but 
even these companies were operating well below their installed capacity. 
 
In the early 1990s, with a representative of the private processors trade body now sitting on the board 
of the newly revived KDB, the influence of the processors was increased, resulting in active harassment 
of SSMVs, who were seen as unfair competition. The KDB refused to license most SSMVs and its 
                                                        
12 Under the Dairy Industry Act, the main urban areas were specified as ‘Scheduled areas’. 
13 Milk cess is a volume-based tax supposed to be paid by all processors and traders. 
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inspectors actively pursued SSMVs, but due to the small number of inspectors and the large number of 
small-scale traders, failed to control them effectively. 
 
Today, the informal sector still dominates: in 2004 it was estimated that of the 1.4 billion litres of milk 
marketed in Kenya each year, 86% was marketed to consumers in the raw state through the informal 
sector (Omore et al., 2004). Sales of processed, packaged milk represented only 14% of milk sold. This 
was more or less the situation throughout the lifetime of the SDP, which was initiated in 1997. Some 
new processors came on the scene, and other disappeared. In 2000 the KCC was relaunched as ‘KCC 
2000’ and then in 2003 as ‘New KCC’, having been bought back by the new government.14 The most 
recent re-launch of KCC has broadened the competition in the formal market segment, contributing to 
better farm gate prices and the current relative exuberance in the dairy sector.  
3.3 Political context: dairy policy in Kenya 
This section presents an overview of policy changes in the dairy sector in Kenya, and attempts to ‘track 
backwards’ from these changes so as to see what influenced them (building on the methodology of an 
Episode Study, as described in Chapter 2). It should be noted at the start that this is a brief 
introduction to dairy policy in Kenya; a more detailed review can be found in Muriuki et al. (2003).  
3.3.1 What is policy? 
In order to assess the pro-poor policy changes that have occurred in the Kenyan dairy sector, and to 
what degree key actors, including SDP, played a role in bringing these about, a broad definition of 
‘policy’ will be used. Policy is considered as a ‘purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of 
actors’ (Anderson, 1975). This goes beyond formal dairy legislation and written policy statements to 
include implementation on the ground, and also covers interpretations of policies and statements of 
intent. Policies are not restricted here to government policies; the purposes and actions of international 
organisations, bilateral agencies, NGOs, farmers’ organisations and the private sector will also be 
included. Changes in attitude and behaviour are also important, reflecting the reality that there is much 
more to policy influencing than formal written policy documents alone.  
 
In other words, changes in dairy policy can take the form of change to a written policy (e.g. the Dairy 
Industry Act), change in policy statements from key decision-makers (e.g. a statement from the Minister 
of Labour giving his support to the informal sector in the dairy industry), a change in the behaviour or 
approach of decision-makers towards the informal sector (e.g. KDB’s provision of certification to 
SSMVs), or more generally the increased public and official awareness of the importance of the 
informal dairy sector to poor people’s livelihoods. 
3.3.2 The policy context 
Kenyan agricultural development is regulated by a mass of legislation. The Government’s Strategy for 
Revitalisation of Agriculture (SRA) policy paper of 2004 stated that:  
 
‘…approximately 130 pieces of legislation (many of which are high level such as Acts of 
Parliament) are currently legally binding. At least one legislation exists to control each sub-sector 
and this comes complete with implementing agencies and regulatory bodies – which together 
constitute the regulatory framework. Many of these laws were enacted during the colonial period 
or straight after independence and some of these older policies are obsolete, unenforceable or 
inconsistent with current policies. Some researchers believe that this increased cost for 
compliance has discouraged private sector participation and investment.’ (Government of Kenya, 
2004) 
 
                                                        
14 The assets of the collapsed KCC had been sold by the previous government to private individuals, and it was relaunched as 
‘KCC 2000’. However, in 2003, the new NARC government bought back KCC and has been rehabilitating it before handing it 
back to be run by dairy farmers themselves.  
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In theory more than a dozen pieces of legislation regulate the Kenyan dairy sector but there is a huge 
disconnect between legislation, how legislation is interpreted to develop regulations, enforcement of 
regulations, and actual practice. Much of the legislation and policy that exists is open to interpretation, 
with the KDB being the body authorised to carry out this interpretation and charged with the 
responsibility of enforcing its resulting regulations.  
3.3.3 Main policy turning points 
Until 1958, traditional marketing of milk in Kenya was largely unregulated. Then in 1958, the Dairy 
Industry Act (Cap. 336) was enacted, mainly to protect the interests of the expanding large-scale settler 
dairy producers, through protecting their urban markets – the so-called ‘scheduled areas’. Despite 
huge changes in the structure of the dairy industry since then, to a large extent the Kenyan dairy 
industry is still regulated by the Act today. The Act had a number of significant impacts on milk 
marketing and it brought into being the KDB as the regulatory body for the dairy industry. In exercising 
its power and performing its functions, the KDB seeks guidance from the minister under whose 
portfolio the dairy industry falls (which has changed a number of times over the past few decades). The 
minister is empowered under the Act to make regulations, such as those relating to mode of charging 
and payment of cess (a volume-based tax), the licensing of milk traders and milk transportation, which 
are then enforced by the KDB through its inspectors and the police. The Act also segregated the dairy 
market into two distinct zones: ‘scheduled’ areas (urban or formal areas) where the market was 
restricted to processed (pasteurised and UHT), packaged milk, and ‘unscheduled’ areas (also known as 
rural or informal areas) where there was no regulation and small-scale producers and traders operated 
as before.  
 
The KDB is the highest body regulating the dairy industry in Kenya and is made up of a chairman and 12 
directors. Until independence KDB directors were predominantly white settlers, but after independence 
were made up of government appointees. The KDB was disbanded in 1972 and its functions transferred 
to the Animal Production Department of the (then) Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and 
Marketing (MoALDM). This situation prevailed until the late 1980s when the government appointed a 
new KDB chairman, although no other directors were appointed until 1998. Throughout this time, large-
scale producers and processors have been able to effectively lobby in favour of their interests, and 
latterly the processors have been represented on the KDB through their trade body, the Kenya Dairy 
Processors Association. SSMVs enjoy no such representation on the KDB despite supplying the vast 
majority of marketed milk. Under the 1958 Act, the KCC was granted a monopoly to buy, process, and 
sell milk in the scheduled areas. Until the early 1970s, access to KCC was limited through contracts, 
milk quota systems and requirements to supply minimum volumes, which disadvantaged small-scale 
producers.  
 
The second major turning point in the dairy industry resulted from the Kibaki Commission’s 
recommendations in 1964 regarding post-independence dairy development. The Commission 
advocated for the abolition of the contracted milk quotas and for them to be replaced by access to the 
KCC by all farmers, as long as their milk was of acceptable quality. Consequently the KCC became a 
guaranteed market for raw milk, as they bought any amount of milk supplied by farmers, regardless of 
demand. During the 1970s and early 1980s KCC underwent a rapid expansion programme, building a 
network of milk cooling and processing plants to handle the growing volume of milk being produced. 
This period coincided with acceleration of the provision of government subsidised clinical, artificial 
insemination (AI) and dipping services. At this time, thanks to KCC’s monopoly on supplying processed 
milk to the urban centres, which was effectively policed, sales of raw milk in Nairobi were negligible. 
 
The third defining moment happened in the early 1980s when these highly subsidised or free services, 
which had been triggered by Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) on African Socialism, became 
unsustainable due to budgetary constraints. For all government supplied services, such as animal 
health and production, the proportion of funds allocated for personnel payments increased steadily at 
the expense of operational expenditure, until it reached a point where virtually all funds were taken up 
by salaries and service provision collapsed. Corruption and mismanagement also contributed to a 
worsening situation, and in 1986 Sessional Paper No. 1 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth 
was released, paving the way for cost sharing for such services. Specific policy actions contained in the 
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1986 Paper included: price decontrols and liberalisation of markets; financial sector policy reforms; 
international trade regulation reforms; government budget rationalisation; divestiture and 
privatisation; parastatal reform; and civil service reform (Government of Kenya, 1986). The 
liberalisation process was forced on the Government due to budgetary problems, making it impossible 
to continue with highly subsidised interventions, most of which were abandoned abruptly without 
proper planning or exit strategies.  
 
Liberalisation of the dairy industry started in the mid-1980s. Price control of UHT milk was ended in 
1987 and for other dairy products in 1992. KCC, and the other processors who entered the market, 
decided the price of fresh milk on a daily basis. This heralded the gradual collapse of KCC through the 
1990s. In 1993 a Dairy Development Policy was published. This policy paper guided the industry on 
how to survive in a liberalised economy and discussed almost all aspects of the dairy industry, from 
breeding to maintaining national self-sufficiency in dairy production. The liberalisation policy’s major 
impacts have been the rapid growth of the formal and informal private sectors that provide input and 
output services, and a redistribution and increase of the overall social and economic benefits of 
market-oriented dairying to smallholder producers, small-scale market agents and consumers. 
However, changes in the legal framework to support the policy revisions have lagged behind the policy 
statements.  
 
As described previously, the dairy industry from the 1990s to the present was characterised by small-
scale production marketed predominantly through SSMVs, yet in a policy environment that was 
interpreted as outlawing the informal marketing of milk. In fact there is nothing in the 1958 Dairy 
Industry Act that explicitly outlaws trade in raw milk and the KDB interprets the provisions of the Public 
Health Act in defining its regulations regarding licensing of SSMVs. The Public Health Act requires 
traders in food products, including milk vendors, to have ‘acceptable premises’, which excludes most 
mobile traders. Confusingly however, the current Dairy Industry Act specifies ‘bicycles or other 
motorised vehicles utilised for storage, distribution or sale of licensed produce’ (Government of Kenya, 
1958) as acceptable ‘premises’ for a milk trader. The result is considerable uncertainty regarding who 
can and cannot be licensed as milk traders. 
 
By 1995, the Government realised there was a need to reform the dairy legal and policy framework to 
better reflect the way the industry had developed. Therefore, by the time the SDP was in its inception 
phase in the mid-1990s, the MoLFD was beginning to consider revising the dairy policy and statutes as 
a way of reforming the industry. This was the policy background and context as the SDP was set in 
motion. During SDP’s lifetime, the MoLFD initiated some activities to review dairy policy and to carry out 
expert and stakeholder consultations. A Dairy Task Force was set up in 2001, which met intermittently 
until 2005.15 Stakeholder consultations were carried out occasionally, usually supported by donor or 
project funds. 
 
Beyond specific dairy sector policy, some important events took place later in SDP’s lifetime. In 
December 2002, President Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) had taken over from 
President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya African Nationalist Union (KANU), and in this climate of political 
transformation, many changes in policy and civil service attitude were expected as the new government 
tried to make its mark. New strategies were developed: a general Economic Recovery Strategy for 
Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) in 2003, and a Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) in 
March 2004. The SRA is a national policy paper for steering development in the agricultural sector in 
Kenya for the period 2004-2014, and was the agricultural sector ministries’ response to the 
implementation of the ERS. The MoLFD was a signatory of the paper. The document proposed far-
reaching policy and institutional changes believed to be necessary for reversing the decline witnessed 
in the agricultural sector and to position it competitively in the global arena. One of the interventions 
proposed by the paper was to review and harmonise the legal, regulatory and institutional framework, 
including bringing all legislation for agricultural sectors under one apex Agriculture Act.  
                                                        
15 The Dairy Task Force, comprising dairy industry experts and key stakeholders, was initially set up in response to USAID’s 
interest in supporting dairy development activities in Kenya. It has subsequently been resurrected at various times, under 
different names, in response to perceived needs to review aspects of dairy sector policy. 
  
14 
3.3.4 Changes in written and implemented policy 
The most significant change in formal written policy has been the revision of the new Dairy Policy and 
Dairy Bill. Some of the policy framework argued for by SDP and its partners had actually been in 
progress already: the last revision of the Dairy Development Policy (2000 edition) and a newly 
proposed Dairy Bill (to replace the outdated 1958 Act) explicitly recognised the importance of the 
domestic raw milk trade, and acknowledged that the informal trade in raw milk needed to be regulated 
and restructured to strengthen the dairy industry as a whole. However, this proposed Bill had been 
persistently delayed, and had made little progress since 2000. 
 
Following the activities of 2003-2004, this Bill was revived. Since this time, the Policy and Bill have 
been going through a long process of revision. In 2004, a decision was taken by the PS that revision of 
the Policy be completed before attending to the Bill. This new Dairy Policy was presented for 
stakeholder consultation in April 2006, and does explicitly recognise the role of SSMVs in the industry. 
Concerning informal milk marketing, the policy states that it will facilitate the transformation of the 
informal milk trade towards formalisation. Specific measures mentioned include development of low 
cost and appropriate technologies for small investors, training programmes on safe milk handling, 
work to improve the standards of milk processing in the informal sector, and provision of incentives for 
improved milk handling and establishment of a supportive milk dealer certification system. The Policy 
also states that KDB functions will be streamlined, self-regulation initiated and transition towards a 
stakeholder-managed institution initiated. 
 
The need to have broader representation of stakeholders on the KDB Board of Directors had also been 
included in previous drafts of the new Dairy Policy. The 2001 draft proposed that the size of the KDB 
Board be increased from 12 to 17 people, to accommodate five farmers representing each province, 
elected from five delegates from each district during an annual general meeting. The Board members 
also proposed to elect members rather than for them to be handpicked by the Minister in charge of 
livestock development from nominates selected by the Central Agricultural Board (CAB). It did not, 
however, make provision for informal traders or consumer groups to sit on the Board. Given the current 
predominance of the informal sector in dairy marketing, this would mean that the majority of dairy 
marketing stakeholders would still not be represented by the KDB Board of Directors. The new Dairy 
Policy talks about KDB’s transformation into a stakeholder-managed institution, and as described 
above, explicitly recognises the role of SSMVs. Whilst this implies some mechanism of representation, 
there remain significant challenges to the formal organisation of these previously informal actors, and 
it is not clear whether this will lead to any representation on the Board.  
 
The details of implementation and legislation to operationalise this policy should be outlined in the 
Dairy Bill, which, to meet the MoLFD’s performance contract, needs to be presented to parliament with 
the new Policy by June 2006. It will then depend on the parliamentary process, which is unpredictable. 
So technically, the supply of raw milk to scheduled areas is still illegal. However, as outlined below, 
through behavioural and attitudinal changes of key organisations, a marked change in implementation 
has already taken place. There have also been repeated public announcements by the Minister and 
Permanent Secretary at the MoLFD emphasising the plan to bring the raw milk traders into the 
regulatory system through training and licensing. 
 
Under the new Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA), the government is planning to review all the 
laws and regulations governing the operations of the agricultural sector with a view to removing 
barriers to production, processing and marketing. They aim for an ‘Amalgamation of existing legislation 
to have fewer broad based acts to suit prevailing circumstances’ (Government of Kenya, 2005). This 
could theoretically affect the new Dairy Bill. But the Dairy Bill is to be presented to parliament before 
June 2006, whilst the time frame of the SRA is 10 years (from 2004 to 2014), and at present, it is very 
difficult to predict how and when the review of legislations will take place.  
 
As previously described, the proliferation of SSMVs was partly a result of the collapse of KCC. Currently, 
the ‘New KCC’ is showing an increasing trend in processing capacity. Some people within MoLFD and 
KDB still argue that the issue of the informal milk market is just a temporary issue, and will cease to be 
an issue at all after KCC is back in the market. However, the SDP findings on consumer demand for raw 
milk suggest that SSMVs will continue to play an important role, and indeed that they were active 
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outside the big urban areas while KCC was at its peak. Even in areas where new processors are 
increasing their intake, SSMVs continue to thrive. 
3.4 The SDP and policy change 
3.4.1 SDP: The beginning (1994-1997) 
The Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP) evolved from the successes and lessons learned from a previous 
ILRI-led integrated research-extension-farmer collaboration that aimed to help resolve smallholder 
dairy farmers’ problems in the coastal region of Kenya. The initial idea was to bring the lessons and 
results of the 1988-1994 coastal project, including systems for supplying milk, into the highland areas 
and the Greater Nairobi area. The Nairobi milk market was at the time consuming over 60% of the 
formally marketed milk in Kenya.  
 
The pre-project discussions, which included the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
(now UK Department for International Development – DFID), resulted in ODA sponsoring a workshop in 
March 1995 for dairy industry stakeholders, to plan and develop a collaborative dairy project to be 
implemented by the (then) Ministry of Livestock Development, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI) and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). By December 1995 DFID had given 
approval for the development and funding of what became known as the Smallholder Dairy (R&D) 
Project or SDP, which officially started in August 1997. 
 
The design of SDP was built upon lessons from the earlier coastal programme, which indicated that for 
SDP to succeed there was need for: 
• Active participation of all major dairy industry stakeholders and key players in the identification 
and resolution of technical, socio-economic and policy constraints along the dairy production-to-
consumption chain; 
• Effective linkages with the livestock ministry and related ministries at policy as well as operational 
level; 
• Effective linkages with the private sector for provision of output and input services;  
• Effective means to implement proposals by feeding directly into the design of pilot initiatives. 
 
As a result, SDP was set up to be managed through a Steering Committee, comprised of major dairy 
industry stakeholders in both the public and private sector,16 chaired by the Director of Livestock 
Production. The committee met quarterly.  
 
The project was collaboratively implemented by MoLD, KARI and ILRI, with MoLD being the lead 
institution. The SDP management consisted of the Project Manager (appointed from MoLD), the 
Assistant Project Manager (from KARI), and the Field Manager/Technical Adviser (from ILRI). The project 
design envisaged a full time Project Manager to take a central role and overall responsibility for delivery 
of the project output, supported by the Assistant Project Manager and the Technical Adviser. However, 
in order to mainstream all the implementing institutions into the management of the project, the 
project decisions were made through a Management Committee (which consisted of representatives of 
the three collaborating institutions and was responsible for overall day-to-day management of the 
project). The project’s implementation also involved close collaboration with other dairy industry 
stakeholders and key players (including government and regulatory bodies, the private sector, and civil 
society organisations) who contributed through identifying and implementing the interventions.  
 
                                                        
16 The SDP Steering Committee consisted of representatives of MoLFD, KARI and ILRI (these were in addition to the project 
staff), together with representatives from Kenya National Farmers Union (now Kenya National Federation of Agricultural 
Producers); Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives; Kenya Dairy Processors’ Association; Dairy Recording Services of 
Kenya; Kenya Bureau of Standards; University of Nairobi; Ministry of Health; Department of Co-operatives (now Ministry of Co-
operative Development and Marketing); Department of Veterinary Services; Development Planning and Information Services 
section of the MoLD (now MoLFD); and a DFID Project Officer (ex-officio member). 
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Key areas proposed for SDP research and development activities were: 
• Analysis of factors constraining the competitiveness of smallholder dairy farmers, including farm 
constraints, markets and infrastructure, and information services;  
• Analysis of policies and institutions affecting the dairy sub-sector, and provision of resulting 
information to support planning needs of stakeholders and policy makers in the dairy sub-sector; 
• Analysis of social benefits of smallholder dairy production, including income, employment and 
child nutrition; 
• Participatory development of improved dairy farm technologies, such as improved fodder plants 
and feeding strategies; 
• Development of appropriate technologies and strategies for small-scale milk and dairy product 
traders; 
• Development of extension and training materials to support smallholder farmers and small milk 
traders, and the development agencies serving them; 
• Spatial analysis of dairy systems for improved targeting of technology and investment. 
 
The project was designed to have two phases of two and four years respectively, and was due to end in 
July 2003. Initially, SDP carried out research and development activities to support sustainable 
improvements to the livelihoods of poor Kenyans through their participation in the dairy sub-sector. As 
described in the following sections though, following reviews of the project, a third phase was added, 
and the project was extended to March 2005. 
 
The initial SDP logical framework (log frame) was developed at the DFID sponsored March 1995 
planning workshop and revised when necessary during the project formulation. See Table 2 for 
changes in the SDP log frame during the three phases, and Table 3 for the main policy-relevant 
activities in each phase.  
 
  
Table 2: Summary of SDP log frames for the three phases 
 Phase I (1997-1999) Phase II (1999-2001) Phase III (2001-2004) 
Super goal   Contribution to sustainable improvements in the 
livelihoods of poor people in Kenya. 
Goal Improved access by dairy farmers to efficient, 
demand driven services, technologies, advice 
and information (RNR Strategy Purpose). 
 
Contribution to sustainable improvements in the 
livelihoods of poor people in Kenya. 
 
Improved access by poor dairy farmers to goods, 
services and output markets, and by other 
farmers to agricultural knowledge services.  
 
Purpose Required actions for creation of a supportive 
operational environment for smallholders 
supplying the Nairobi milk market agreed. 
 
Improved access by smallholder dairy farmers to 
technologies, advice and information. 
 
Policies and institutions support: a) dairying by 
the poor; and b) effective agricultural knowledge 
systems in support of the poor. 
 
Outputs • Project and field management structure 
established and effective. 
• Dairy systems service the Nairobi milk 
market described. 
• Investment opportunities, policy options, 
technological constraints and knowledge 
gaps identified. 
• Ex-ante impact of policy and technology 
options assessed and priorities agreed. 
• Requirements for improving sub sector 
performance identified and prioritised 
interventions designed. 
• Appropriate technology interventions 
designed and on-farm testing established. 
• A mechanism for promoting private sector 
extension-research linkages established. 
• Participatory information gathering, 
monitoring and evaluation and impact 
assessment systems established and in 
place. 
 
• Project and field management structures 
effective in new areas.  
• Updated picture of dairy sector in target 
areas. 
• Understanding of smallholder dairy systems 
in new areas. 
• Interventions identified, prioritised and 
tested and policy options recommended. 
• Interventions widely disseminated and 
adopted. 
• Capacity for collaborative research-
extension enhanced. 
 
• Understanding of the dairy sub-sector and 
its knowledge system gained through 
applying a livelihoods, pro-poor perspective.  
• Policy and institutional issues that inhibit 
improvements to the livelihoods of the poor 
identified and analysed. 
• Policy and institutional reform strategy 
implemented. 
• Dairy technologies relevant to the poor 
delivered to dissemination systems. 
 
 
  
Table 3: SDP timeline and summary of key research activities and policy-influencing events  
  Activity Notes 
Phase I 
1997-1999 
  Focus: characterisation of smallholder dairy sector supplying Nairobi milk 
market; development of appropriate technologies for small-scale dairy 
farmers. 
 1997-1999 Characterisation studies of dairy production, marketing and 
consumption in the milk-shed supplying the Nairobi area. 
 
 1998 Rapid Appraisal completed: economic and structural analysis of 
dairy sub-sector, identification of constraints to performance.  
First overview of status of dairy industry since liberalisation.  
Showed large numbers of dairy-dependent livelihoods, and importance of 
informal market. 
Phase II 
1999-2001 
  Focus: Extended to include other areas of medium and high potential; 
further development of technologies/ increased focus on their uptake; 
characterisation of dairy sub-sector in Western Kenya; public health field 
study. 
 1999-2002 Characterisation studies of dairy production, marketing and 
consumption in Western Kenya. 
 
 1999-2000 Public Health Field Survey. Began to assess public health hazards of informal milk marketing. 
 1999-2000 Fieldwork on milk consumption and demand patterns. Showed how whole industry, including informal market driven by consumer 
demands, based on affordability and taste preferences. 
 Dec 2000 Review of ‘Public health hazards associated with informal milk 
marketing’ completed. 
Quantified health risks, and demonstrated they could be controlled. Also 
showed near universal practice of boiling milk, which eliminated human 
health risks. 
 Oct 2000 Snapshot Review by DFID. Led to change in project focus onto policy and institutional change. 
 2001-2002 Fieldwork on employment in the dairy industry. Showed 350,000 full-time equivalent waged workers employed on 
smallholder dairy farms, and that the vast majority of jobs in dairy marketing 
were in the informal sector. 
Phase III 
2001-2004 
  Focus: Shift to targeting policy and institutional reform to support dairying 
by the poor and effective agricultural knowledge systems of the poor. 
 Feb 2001 Project retreat to develop new log frame. Log frame included policy influencing activities. 
 Feb 2001 Workshop on ‘Assessing and managing milk-borne health risks 
for the benefit of consumers in Kenya’. 
SDP invited onto Dairy Public Health Committee – formed as a 
result of the workshop. 
Findings presented on level of risk associated with different market 
channels, and how to control risk.  
Controversy caused by the finding that most milk sold, both by processors 
and informal agents, failed to meet required standards proved controversial. 
  
  Activity Notes 
Phase III 
cont. 
2001-2002 Research on ‘Policy Environment of the Dairy Sub-Sector’ started.  
 2001-2003 Participatory work with SSMVs to develop training approaches 
and appropriate containers, with testing of outputs. 
Initially collaborative effort with KDB and MoH.  
SSMVs trained in basic milk testing, hygiene and handling; easy-clean milk 
containers developed. SSMVs encouraged to form groups and seek 
licensing. 
 2001 SDP presented evidence at MoLFD stakeholder consultations on 
dairy policy, on importance of informal sector and the lack of 
adequate stakeholder (consumers and informal traders) 
representation in KDB.  
 
 Jan 2003 Workshop to develop policy influencing strategy. 
 
 
 May 2003 Series of articles written by SDP published in special editions of 
national media, presenting evidence and policy implications. 
Broadly outlined the policy implications of SDP’s research. 
Independent articles written by journalists based on this evidence 
supported a new positive way of looking at informal sector. 
 Aug 2003 SDP starts to engage with civil society organisations as advocacy 
partners, and plan for proposed high-level ‘Dairy Policy Forum’. 
Increases avenues to influence policy by getting evidence to organisations 
that would actively advocate, rather than be constrained to communication 
of evidence. 
 2004 Further analysis of employment date, and publication of 
employment study. 
Showed 40,000 jobs in informal marketing and 350,000 full-time waged 
employees on smallholder dairy farms. 
 Sept 2003 Series of policy briefs drafted, and video commissioned. Briefs presented policy-relevant findings in accessible format. 
Video presented real stakeholders’ speaking about the issues that SDP’s 
research had highlighted. 
 Dec 2003 Coalition of SDP partners, including CSOs, responded to ‘Safe 
milk campaign’. 
Meetings with Ministers for Labour and Livestock organised by 
SDP’s CSO partners. 
SDP provided research evidence that CSOs used to counter processors’ 
claims. ‘Milk war’ waged in media with CSOs continuing to use SDP research 
evidence to counter arguments used by KDB and milk processors. 
 Feb 2004 KDB become partners in the Dairy Policy Forum. Following intervention of the Director of KARI. 
 May 2004 Dairy Policy Forum held by SDP and partners, now including the 
KDB and CSOs. 
Attended by government ministers, MPs and key industry stakeholders 
Presentation of findings that supported pro-poor policy reform.  
Policy briefs officially launched and the video ‘Unheard voices from Kenya’s 
Dairy Sector’ shown. 
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3.4.2 SDP Phase I (1997-1999): Dairy research and development in Kenya 
During the first phase, the farmer producers were seen as primary beneficiaries of the project, even 
though SDP recognised that it would need to work with other stakeholders. The project focused efforts 
on the development of ‘best-bet’ farm technologies in order to overcome farmers’ problems and to 
improve the livelihoods of dairy farmers. Constraints were identified using participatory appraisal 
approaches as well as quantitative characterisation of the smallholder dairy sector supplying milk to 
Nairobi and other urban centres in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies.  
 
The SDP’s Rapid Appraisal (RA), completed by mid-1998, was perhaps the first major activity that 
placed the project in a position to influence policy reform. The RA examined the dairy production 
systems, carried out an economic and structural analysis of dairying, and addressed policy and 
institutional issues related to dairy development in Kenya. This provided stakeholders in the sub-sector 
with an overview of the situation at that time, as well as insights into the main issues that required 
urgent attention to further enhance the benefits of smallholder dairying. The central emphasis of the 
appraisal was to identify the constraints to the performance of the dairy sub-sector, whether technical, 
economic or institutional in nature. It was probably also the first study that informed the government 
(through the Department of Livestock Development) of the actual status of the dairy industry since 
liberalisation. Information from the RA on the extent to which the informal sector had become a major 
market channel influenced the Ministry’s Dairy Task Force, leading to more attention being paid to that 
channel. 
 
More detailed information was collected in characterisation studies of randomly selected households 
in Kiambu (a district close to Nairobi) and other districts in Central Province. These studies were 
completed by the end of 1998 and were designed to: i) describe the current structure of dairy 
production and practices of dairy farmers in various parts of Kenya; ii) assess current and future 
constraints and opportunities facing the dairy industry; and iii) identify the types of dairy producers 
who should be targeted by the SDP project, given the focus on assisting the most resource poor. 
Seasonal variation in farming practices and detailed estimates of feeding and costs of production were 
explored in a year long study with 21 farmers from Kiambu. Even at this early stage, it was recognised 
that much of Kenya was supplying the Nairobi market, due to the high demand and prices there.  
 
Between 1999 and 2000, the project also undertook an assessment of the public health hazards of 
informal milk marketing in Kenya, which later proved very influential.  
 
Towards the end of Phase I, it became obvious from SDP’s research and engagement with other 
stakeholders, that there were many important aspects of dairy-related livelihoods that were currently 
not being addressed in research or in policy dialogue, and that this dialogue should be broadened to 
include issues of employment and the livelihoods of traders (especially in the informal sector) and 
consumers, as well as producers. 
 
SDP had an in-depth output-to-purpose review17 (OPR) after 18 months of Phase I, carried out in January 
1999. At this stage, DFID itself was changing, with an increased focus on livelihoods and on policy-level 
interventions. Combined with DFID’s change of emphasis to policies and institutions, the organisation 
started to close down many of its previously funded projects. After the early stages of the project, it 
became clear that SDP was one of the projects that DFID wanted to close.18 The project management 
team argued forcefully about the relevance of the work and resisted closure. After this time, whilst DFID 
monitored activities through normal processes, and kept pressure to ensure the focus on policy 
influencing was maintained, there was no further threat of closure, and significant support was 
subsequently given to SDP’s policy-influencing activities. 
 
                                                        
17 DFID-funded projects are usually reviewed every 18 to 24 months. These reviews assess progress on achieving outputs 
against purpose.  
18 As well as the desire to concentrate on policies and institutions, in a way that SDP at that stage was not doing, DFID argued 
that people with dairy cattle were not poor, and therefore not the most appropriate use of their funds. However SDP managed 
to dissuade DFID from closing the project, arguing that many poor people’s livelihoods were dependent on the sector. 
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This OPR led to the first changes to the project focus. Changes to the log frame, especially under the 
purpose section, were necessary in order to closely reflect the project’s new Phase II goal (Table 2 
shows the difference in goals for the three phases of the project changes). As a result of this positive 
review, a four-year Phase II stage was approved.  
3.4.3 SDP Phase II (1999-2000): Change of focus 
The results of Phase I research were presented at a seminar at the National Agricultural Research 
Laboratory (NARL) in Nairobi in May 1999. Phase II of SDP attempted to develop the Phase I 
technologies further and also focused on the uptake of those technologies. The project also extended 
its geographical coverage to other areas of high and medium potential for milk production.  
 
To achieve the new goal of ‘Contribution to sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of poor people 
in Kenya’ the SDP team held a retreat in October 1999 to plan project activities and appoint three teams 
to carry out specific tasks. These ‘task teams’ were: 
• Characterisation and diagnosis 
• Validation and dissemination 
• Management team (project manager, assistant project manager and field managers) 
 
Phase II activities included a characterisation study of Western Kenya, conducted in 2000, and also a 
detailed longitudinal survey of dairy production in Nakuru and Nyandarua. This phase also saw the 
completion of the initial public health field activity.  
 
In 2000, DFID, with the support of SDP management, called for a ‘snapshot’ review by an external 
consultant to quickly evaluate progress between OPRs. At this stage, the Sustainable Livelihoods 
approach, and focus on policy-level impact, as described above, was informing most of DFID’s 
decisions. A particular concern of the snapshot review was to assess how the SDP activities, outputs 
and purpose were actually contributing to addressing the issues affecting Kenya’s smallholder dairy 
systems in a rapidly changing policy and institutional environment.  
 
The review reported favourably on SDP’s progress but, due to the changes in the policy and 
institutional environment in Kenya, recommended that there was a need to develop a strategy for the 
reform of dairy policy and research and knowledge services in order to increase SDP’s impact. It was 
acknowledged that it was difficult to have significant uptake of technologies at farm level in the 
prevailing policy environment. Regarding the changes, the SDP project manager noted: 
 
‘The conclusion was that the project is more likely to impact on policies (than through 
technologies) relating to dairy sector. This is in part because of the more conducive environment 
for policy reform within Kenya and also because the project had established good relationships 
with key players in the formulation of dairy policy. The Reviewer therefore recommended that SDP 
develop a strategy for reform of the dairy policy and for the wider reform of research and 
knowledge services. The SDP activities and output for this new role would be built into a revised 
logical framework (now Phase III log frame) while ensuring their integration into the ongoing wider 
formulation of Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS) and the subsequent roll out of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).’ (Muriuki, 2005) 
 
Soon after the snapshot review of October 2000, the project log frame was changed again, Phase II was 
wound up, and Phase III of SDP began. 
3.4.4 SDP Phase III (2000-2005): Looking for impact 
Activities and events during Phase III are described in more detail than the preceding phases. This is 
because events in this phase were picked out by interviewees and workshop participants as being of 
specific relevance in terms of influence on policy change. However it was stressed by many people that 
policy influencing activities in Phase III built on the sound research evidence and credibility of SDP as a 
stakeholder established during Phases I and II, and activities during those phases. 
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2000-2002: More active engagement with policy 
The SDP management had reservations about the capacity of the project staff to reorient from technical 
interventions towards policy impact. However, SDP developed and wrote the log frame, with the 
agreement that DFID would provide support on capacity building through consultancies. The SDP 
quickly set in motion mechanisms to mainstream the recommendations by forming a Policy Task Team, 
drawing up Terms of Reference for the policy work and organising a retreat in February 2001 to draw up 
a strategy for policy influencing.  
 
Meanwhile, in February 2001, the findings of the SDP public health field activities of 1999-2000 were 
presented at a stakeholder consultative workshop on ‘Assessing and managing milk-borne health risks 
for the benefit of consumers in Kenya’. The findings presented at this workshop proved to be very 
controversial, and this became one of the key events in the life of the SDP.  
 
One of the findings of the survey was that most milk being sold, both by processors and by SSMVs, was 
in fact failing to meet their respective quality standards developed by the Kenyan Bureau of Standards 
(KEBS).19 As a result of this workshop, a Dairy Public Health Committee (PHC) was convened by the KDB 
and MoLFD, comprised of representatives of MoLFD, KDB, KDPA, KEBS MoH and SDP. Their mandate 
was to make recommendations to address the issues raised by SDP’s research. Although the 
committee met until 2003 and made various recommendations, inertia within the KDB meant that none 
were acted upon.  
 
2002-2003: A strategy for influencing policy 
In May 2002, a retreat was held to plan how to better deliver on the new log frame. It was realised that 
although the log frame had been changed to focus more on policy influencing, the behaviour of the 
project staff had not yet changed and was still focused on R&D. So an outline strategy for policy 
influencing was developed. 
 
SDP activities related to milk hygiene continued in Phase III. Likely causes of poor hygiene in milk from 
SSMVs included lack of training in milk handling, and the use of plastic jerry-cans. SSMVs avoided the 
use of recommended aluminium containers because of the expense, given the common practice of 
confiscation of containers by police. SDP therefore worked with KDB and the Ministry of Health 
(represented by District and Council Public Health Officers) to test a pilot scheme whereby an 
agreement was made to licence SSMVs trained in basic milk testing, hygiene and handling. A set of 
training materials and training guidelines were developed and tested in three milk producing areas. In 
each area, up to 20 SSMVs were encouraged to form groups licensed by KDB, who along with the 
Ministry of Health officers were also involved in the training. SDP also developed a simple technology 
for milk transport, namely non-spilling, hygienic and easy-clean milk containers at affordable prices.  
 
However, as Phase III progressed, there still seemed very little achievement in terms of policy 
influencing or a well-defined strategy for policy advocacy. In 2002, a DFID Associate Professional 
Officer was seconded to SDP. The terms of reference included supporting management to develop a 
strategy for policy influencing to achieve policy change. In January 2003, SDP organised a workshop to 
develop a detailed policy influencing strategy. This workshop was facilitated by a consultant with 
extensive experience in policy processes and policy influencing, and with a background in the NGO 
sector. At the workshop, dairy industry stakeholders were mapped as ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘opponents’ of 
changes in policy, and a diagnosis was made of SDP capacity to engage in policy advocacy. As a result 
SDP was able to develop a detailed advocacy strategy. 
 
Part of this policy-influencing strategy was to identify and foster links with CSOs that could bring 
capacity to engage in aspects of policy advocacy in which the SDP implementing institutions could not 
engage.20 During 2003, SDP started working together with several CSOs including ITDG (Intermediate 
                                                        
19 The specific standards were in relation to coliform bacteria, which are a good indicator of overall hygiene since they are of 
faecal origin. KEBS specifies different standards for pasteurised and raw milk in the market chain, with higher bacterial counts 
permitted in raw milk.  
20 SDP capacity weaknesses, as identified at the 2003 Policy Strategy Workshop, included: (i) capacity to communicate 
effectively with a range of stakeholders; (ii) ability to strengthen capacities of traders and farmers to advocate for themselves; 
(iii) ability to institutionalise the involvement of key stakeholders in the policy process; (iv) ability to understand linkages 
between dairy sector and other sectors and livelihood issues. Initially the link with CSOs was proposed in order to address the 
  
23
Technology Development Group), IPAR (Institute of Policy Analysis and Research), Action Aid Kenya, 
SITE (Strengthening Informal Sector Training and Enterprise), and Land O’Lakes. These relationships 
were based on mutual interest in the livelihoods of the poor. SDP did not contract or pay for inputs 
provided by the CSOs. This strategic alliance was to be highly significant as the advocacy CSOs 
committed themselves to championing the policy changes suggested by SDP’s research findings. This 
solved a pressing problem as none of the SDP partners had a mandate for policy change advocacy. The 
newly appointed DFID Associate Professional Officer acted as the main coordinator of these linkages 
between SDP and the CSOs.  
 
In August 2003, at a second OPR, it was concluded that SDP had successfully transformed from a 
project that informed and advised on policy and research-extension, into one that actively mediated in 
the delivery of policy change and knowledge systems in the national dairy industry.21  
 
Also in August 2003, an existing plan for SDP to hold a high-level Dairy Policy Forum was widened to 
include the CSOs as co-hosting partners. The purpose of the Forum was to present SDP’s research 
results and to highlight their implications for policy. Six evidence-based policy briefs were prepared for 
the Policy Forum to lay out various issues in the dairy sub-sector, including the demand for dairy 
produce in Kenya, employment generation, competitiveness of smallholder dairy enterprises, public 
health issues, and improved child nutrition due to milk consumption (SDP, 2004a-f; SDP 2005a-d). 
Each policy brief gave an outline of the issue, backed up by extensive SDP research results, and 
presented conclusions and policy implications. In fact, these policy briefs were used by SDP staff and 
their CSO partners as soon as they were drafted, before they were even printed or officially launched.  
 
2003-2004: More focused policy engagement  
 
The ‘Milk War’  
In December 2003, however, the Kenya Dairy Processors Association (KDPA), a coalition of milk 
processors and TetraPak (a packaging manufacturer), launched a ‘Safe Milk Campaign’ against the 
SSMVs, using television, radio and newspaper advertisements and leaflets. Whilst planned and funded 
by these private companies, the campaign was officially sponsored by the KDB and MoH, and therefore 
perceived to be supported by government. The campaign was also co-funded by Land O’Lakes.22 The 
campaign’s message was that the consumption of raw milk was dangerous, because of milk 
adulteration by informal milk traders. The informal milk traders were portrayed as criminals who added 
potentially dangerous substances to preserve or increase milk volumes in order to boost their profits. It 
was widely thought that the intention of the large processors in launching this campaign was to stamp 
out what they regarded as their ‘unfair’ competitors – the SSMVs. The processors, however, argued that 
their intention was to warn consumers of the potential dangers of consuming raw milk. The campaign 
flagged up public health concerns, especially zoonotic diseases such as brucellosis and tuberculosis. 
The processors claimed it was their corporate duty to warn customers. 
 
With its negative portrayal of informal milk traders as criminals, and the inaccuracy of the information 
released, the campaign was recognised by SDP and its CSO partners as being potentially extremely 
damaging to large numbers of poor peoples’ dairy-dependent livelihoods. As a result, the CSO 
partners, IPAR, ActionAid Kenya, ITDG East Africa and SITE, supported by SDP, held a press conference 
on 3rd December 2003 to contest the campaign. They issued a press statement using SDP evidence to 
show that the claim that informal milk traders adulterated milk was not true. They also used SDP 
evidence to show that unsubstantiated health concerns were likely to reduce overall milk consumption, 
reduce health benefits to low income customers and destroy hundreds of thousands of farmers’ and 
traders’ livelihoods. The CSOs also raised the point that there was a need to engage with the SSMVs 
because of their substantial role in the milk market and the potential for job creation for the rural poor. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
issue of capacity building for disempowered stakeholder groups (especially small traders). However, it soon became obvious 
that working with the likeminded CSOs brought significant additional capacities relating to policy advocacy. 
21 This conclusion was based on several factors: the perception that Kenya was ripe for rapid policy change; the strong links 
SDP had built to the organs of policy and knowledge systems; and the fact that it was now clear that SDP was only responsible 
for delivery at the output rather than purpose level of its log frame.  
22 Land O’Lakes subsequently indicated that as they had some funds allocated for increasing milk consumption in Kenya, they 
had thought that the campaign was for this purpose. 
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SDP, although actively engaged in the process leading to the press statement, was procedurally 
constrained from playing a leading role in policy advocacy processes, because of SDP’s collaborating 
institutions’ mandates. ILRI, as an international research centre, did not want to be seen as engaging in 
local (Kenyan) politics; KARI, as a parastatal government research institute, did not want to be seen as 
influencing government policies; and MoLFD, as the implementer and the regulator of dairy industry, 
did not want to be seen as influencing their own policies. This awkward position left SDP unable to be 
directly involved in advocacy activities for the policy influencing processes, although the log frame 
required them to deliver on a policy change.  
 
This press statement started what became popularly referred to as the ‘Milk War’, as the KDB and the 
processors tried repeatedly to challenge the CSO partners’ statement. But they were unable to produce 
any evidence to back their claims, whilst the robust evidence from SDP strongly supported the CSOs’ 
arguments. During the period of the Milk War, from December 2003 to March 2004, the newspapers 
were full of debate as the views of the opposing sides were put forward. The public also voiced their 
opinions, which mostly supported the CSO partners’ views. In the end, the processors decided to 
withdraw the Safe Milk Campaign, most probably because they saw the potential for negative publicity 
backfiring on them. In spite of the withdrawal of the campaign, the debate in the newspapers 
continued right up until the time of the Dairy Policy Forum in May 2004.  
 
Meanwhile, the CSO partners were using their personal contacts to lobby decision-makers and 
parliamentarians for support. IPAR lobbied the parliamentarians, and ITDG successfully arranged 
separate meetings with the Minister for Labour and the Minister for Livestock in January 2004. The high-
level lobbying resulted in an increased profile for the SSMVs and widespread acceptance of their 
importance in the dairy industry.  
 
Within SDP, further personnel changes occurred in early 2004 when the project manager retired and 
was replaced by a colleague. A final retreat was held in February 2004 to evaluate progress and to 
develop a communication plan together with exit and hand-over strategies as the end of the project 
(scheduled for March 2005) drew nearer.  
 
Dairy Policy Forum 
Throughout this time, the SDP and their CSO partners had been continuing with the plan to organise a 
high-profile Dairy Policy Forum, targeting key decision-makers, parliamentarians and high-level dairy 
industry stakeholders, to present the range of SDP evidence that supported pro-poor policy reform. 
These plans were modified when the Director of KARI, as a way of bridging the gap and bringing KDB on 
board, instructed that KDB should join MoLFD, KARI and ILRI as convenors of the Forum, with the CSOs 
also remaining on the organising committee. The KARI Director also offered to assist with moderating 
the KDB stand.  
 
Initially, the KDB Managing Director was highly suspicious of the SDP CSO partners and was unwilling 
to let any controversial evidence be aired. The MoLFD permanent secretary had clearly directed that this 
Forum should go ahead, following a meeting called by SDP’s partners. However, the Director of 
Livestock Production and the KDB Managing Director still used various delaying tactics, perhaps hoping 
that the organisers would give up. The partners worked hard to convince them not only of the need to 
present all the evidence, but that there was a real opportunity for the KDB to be shown in a positive 
light, in actually ‘grasping the nettle’ of developing the informal sector in a way that no other 
developing country had effectively managed to do. It is not clear whether they were in fact convinced, 
or whether the delaying tactics ran out of steam. But eventually plans for the Forum were agreed. As 
part of this agreement KDB put their name to a joint Policy Brief which had been drafted by SDP and its 
CSO partners.23 KDB also agreed that a video, already made by SDP and ActionAid Kenya to present the 
‘Unheard Voices from Kenya’s Dairy Sector’, could be shown at the Policy Forum. 
 
A successful Dairy Policy Forum was finally held in May 2004, attended by the Ministers for Livestock 
and for National Planning, together with parliamentarians and over 140 other delegates. 
                                                        
23 This joint brief summarised the range of evidence from SDP and others and made some broad policy recommendations. 
Whilst some of the potentially controversial recommendations were ‘toned down’ slightly in order for KDB to agree to put their 
name to it, SDP considered this joint statement to be an important milestone in achieving consensus and moving on from the 
conflict over the ‘Milk War’. 
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Parliamentarians themselves put pressure on the government to pass the new Dairy Bill and to ensure 
the fair and equitable development of the industry. Farmers’ voices were also very prominent at the 
Forum, especially through a farmer advocacy group in the North Rift Valley called ‘Ngoma’, that 
ActionAid Kenya had been supporting.24 The video showing small-scale farmers, small-scale traders and 
poor consumers voicing their own concerns and talking about issues that affected them was shown at 
the Forum, and made a significant impression on participants. 
 
At this Policy Forum, the Minister of Livestock gave a commitment to passing the stalled Dairy Bill, and 
to take account of the mass of evidence and stakeholder opinion presented. 
 
2004-2005: Further policy engagement and close of project 
Following the Dairy Policy Forum and media coverage of the issues, some MPs directly approached SDP 
partners and requested more information about the issues covered in the reform. The partners thus 
became involved in providing input into the development of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Agriculture’s work plan. They also organised a special meeting with the Committee, in response to 
these requests, to present a range of evidence in more detail. 
 
In November 2004 SDP was given a full session at KARI’s Annual Conference to present their findings, 
an event that was further evidence of the acknowledgement of SDP prominence in agricultural research 
and development in Kenya. 
 
SDP finally finished as a project in March 2005, when a final end-of-project workshop and open day 
was held. On this day, an additional set of Policy Briefs was launched, bringing the total number to 10. 
A wide range of dairy industry stakeholders attended and viewed displays covering the whole range of 
SDP research and policy-influencing activities. 
 
Whilst the project itself ended, policy-relevant research and development activities are continuing 
through the SDP implementing organisations’ collaborations with other partners, in particular through 
the USAID-funded KDDP, and through ongoing work with KDB and SITE in piloting approaches to 
licensing and training of milk traders. 
3.4.5 Comparative timeline of events 
Table 4 shows a comparative timeline of key events in the dairy sector, dairy policy, SDP and external 
environment. The external environment column lists some events that were described in other sections, 
but which during the analysis in the following sections were considered as important ‘external’ 
influences on the policy processes described. 
                                                        
24 ‘Ngoma’ is a farmer group that was formed to highlight the needs of maize and dairy farmers in the North Rift Valley. 
ActionAid Kenya worked with Ngoma to build capacity for the group to advocate for their needs. 
  
Table 4: Comparative timeline of key events in Kenya’s dairy sector, dairy policy, SDP activities, and external environment  
Date Historical context – Evolution of 
Kenya’s dairy industry 
Political context – Dairy policy in 
Kenya 
SDP and partners External environment 
1925 KCC established – monopoly on 
processing and marketing in major 
towns until 1983. Commercial 
dairying by settlers only.  
  Colonial rule. Policy and institutions 
entirely focused on interests of 
settlers. 
1954 Kenyans able to engage in 
commercial dairy farming. 
Swynnerton Plan for Intensification 
of African Agriculture allows 
indigenous Kenyan’s to engage in 
commercial agriculture.  
  
1958 Law enforced by KDB and police. 
Works in favour of large-scale white 
producers who controlled KDB.  
Dairy Industry Act: segregates dairy 
market into scheduled areas (urban 
areas; processed and packaged milk) 
and unscheduled areas (no 
regulation; small-scale producers).  
  
1963 At independence, many settlers 
leave, their dairy animals are 
redistributed to indigenous Kenyans 
and land sub-divided and 
redistributed.  
  Independence 
1964 KDB dominated by government 
appointees; large-scale producers 
still able to lobby for their interests. 
KCC gives quotas to dairy co-ops and 
self-help groups to supply milk.  
Sessional Paper No. 10 (Government 
of Kenya, 1965) on African Socialism: 
general policy of more equitable 
distribution of resources. 
  
1965 KCC becomes guaranteed market and 
able to buy any amount from farmers. 
Kibaki Commission: leads to 
scrapping of KCC quotas; all farmers 
who can meet quality standards now 
able to supply to KCC. GoK increases 
supply of subsidised clinical, AI and 
dipping services. 
  
1977 Small-scale farmers become major 
producers of milk. 
   
 
  
1983 KCC monopoly on milk processing 
broken by licensing of first dairy co-
ops. 
   
1986  Sessional Paper No. 1 Economic 
Management for Renewed Growth 
starts liberalisation and introduces 
cost-sharing for GoK services. 
  
1988   Collaborative research (involving 
KARI and ILRI on dairy processing 
and marketing in Coast Region 
(1988-1994). 
 
1991  Dairy Master Plan: paves way for 
liberalisation and milk price 
decontrol of the dairy sector. 
  
1992 Gradual collapse of KCC starts. 
Emergence of thousands of SSMVs 
and also private dairy processors. 
Price control of milk scrapped.   
1994 
 
KDB invites milk processors to 
replace KCC representatives on 
KDB resulting active campaign 
against SSMVs and refusal to license 
and them. 
 Discussions start with ODA on further 
collaborative dairy research focusing 
on highlands supplying Nairobi milk 
market. 
 
1997   Launch of SDP 
Phase I: 1997-1999 
 
1999 Milk processors and package 
manufacturers encourage KDB to 
enforce ban on selling raw milk in 
scheduled areas and run advertising 
campaign in local press to promote 
consumption of processed milk. But 
number of SSMVs in scheduled areas 
continues to increase. 
MoA sets up Dairy Policy Review 
Committee (DPRC). DPRC informed on 
status of dairy industry post-
liberalisation through SDP research. 
Resulted in more attention paid to 
informal sector. 
Rapid Appraisal completed: 
economic and structural analysis of 
dairy sub-sector. 
 
Public Health Field Survey 
 
DFID starts focusing increasingly on 
policies and institutions and their 
influence on poor people’s 
livelihoods. 
 
DFID advised SDP that it should 
broaden consideration of 
livelihood issues related to 
smallholder dairy sector to include 
employment and traders. 
 
  
1999  Processors and package 
manufacturers introduce cheaper 
packaging materials and lower price 
of processed milk. 
 SDP Phase II starts 
 
Review completed of public health 
hazards associated with informal 
milk marketing showed near 
universal practice of boiling milk 
minimised risks. 
 
2000 Land O’Lakes began working in 
Kenya to stimulate milk consumption 
and marketing through provision of 
training to farmers groups in writing 
business proposals to gain credit. 
Findings of public health review 
informed debate within Dairy Policy 
Review Committee and more broadly.
‘Snapshot’ Review of SDP Start of Kenyan Constitutional Review 
process. 
Dec 2000   SDP Phase III starts  
Feb 2001  Establishment of KDB Public Health 
Committee made up of GoK, 
processors and SDP to address 
issues raised and identify strategies 
to overcome them. 
SDP organised workshop: ‘Assessing 
and managing milk-borne health 
risks for the benefit of consumers 
in Kenya’ at which SDP research 
findings were presented.  
 
Jan 2002  MoA hold stakeholder consultation 
meetings to inform drafting of new 
Dairy Industry Bill.  
(SDP’s evidence fed into MoA 
consultations and led to recognition 
of importance/role of raw milk 
market but no change to stakeholder 
representation in KDB.) 
Research on ‘Policy Environment of 
Kenya’s Dairy Sub-sector’ started. 
SDP presented evidence at MoA’s 
consultations on importance of 
informal sector and the lack of 
adequate stakeholder representation 
in KDB.  
FAO Technical Co-operation 
Programme with KDB. 
Dec 2002 Milk processors increasingly 
pressurise KDB to stamp-out 
hawking of raw milk. 
 SDP/KDB/MoH collaborative work 
with SSMVs to tackle problem of 
milk spoilage.  
General elections in Kenya. 
New NARC government. 
July 2003   SDP starts to engage with civil 
society organisations supportive of 
SSMVs as advocacy partners. 
 
Oct 2003   Series of policy briefs on major 
policy-relevant findings drafted.  
Video commissioned on ‘Unheard 
voices from Kenya’s Dairy Sector’. 
 
  
Nov 2003 ‘Safe milk campaign’ launched, 
funded by dairy processors, which 
characterised informal sector as 
major health risk. 
 Coalition of SDP partners, including 
NGOs, responded to ‘Safe milk 
campaign’. 
 
‘Milk War’ waged in local press (Dec 
2003 to Feb 2004). 
 
Jan 2004   Meetings with Ministers for Labour 
and Livestock organised by SDP’s 
CSO partners. 
 
Feb 2004 Counter-campaign by SDP partners 
influenced withdrawal of ‘Safe milk 
campaign’. 
CSOs lobby decision-makers and 
MPs and succeed in gaining 
ministerial support for SSMVs. 
Having been directed by the Director 
of KARI, SDP convinced an initially 
reluctant KDB to be a partner in a 
Dairy Policy Form. 
 
Mar 2004 Milk processors and package 
manufacturers shift focus of 
advertising campaigns away from 
attacking raw milk market towards 
emphasis on benefits of processed 
milk to consumers and engage with 
some SSMVs to distribute their 
products. 
NARC Government launches its 
‘Strategy for Revitalising 
Agriculture’ which includes proposal 
to harmonise the legal, regulatory 
and institutional framework including 
one apex Agriculture Act. 
  
May 2004  Forum led to MPs lobbying 
government to proceed to pass new 
Dairy Bill and SDP partners providing 
input to Parliamentary Committee on 
Agriculture. 
Dairy Policy Forum hosted by SDP 
and partners, now including the KDB 
and CSOs. Policy briefs officially 
launched and the video ‘Unheard 
voices from Kenya’s Dairy Sector’ 
shown. 
 
2005 
(ongoing) 
 New draft Dairy Policy rewritten to 
include explicit recognition of role of 
SSMVs and timetable for KDB 
becoming a stakeholder-owned 
body. 
  
  
30 
 
 
3.5 Behavioural change of key stakeholders and SDP’s role in this 
We have now ‘tracked back’ from the changes in the dairy policy environment itself in the form of an 
Episode Study (Section 3.3), and ‘tracked forwards’ from the inception of SDP in the form of a Case 
Study (Section 3.4). As described in chapter on research approach and framework (Chapter 2), the third 
and final element to this study draws on Outcome Mapping. Outcome Mapping does not focus 
specifically on the policy itself, or the SDP log frames, but instead on the actual behavioural change 
that occurred among the key actors involved. The results of the Outcome Mapping-based exercise will 
be presented in this section. 
3.5.1 Changes in attitudes and behaviour of key actors 
The participants at the ROA workshop were first asked to list all the stakeholders in relation to SDP, and 
a long list was created.25 They were then asked to pare this list down to the key stakeholders involved 
(these are the stakeholders that are presented in Table 5 below), and to discuss the changes that had 
occurred in these stakeholders’ behaviours and attitudes. Each change in behaviour of each actor was 
then written on a card, and stuck up on the wall at roughly the time the change occurred to create a 
chronological ‘Wall Map’ (see Figure 1). Detailed notes were written on the back of the card as to the 
causes of the change according to participants. 
 
It is evident that substantial changes in behaviour had taken place over the life time of the project 
among many of the actors. It is also clear that there has been a much wider change in the way most 
people perceive the informal milk market and the way forward for the development of the dairy industry 
in Kenya. These changes were further explored and triangulated in follow-up interviews with the 
stakeholders themselves. A summary of the behavioural change of key stakeholders is presented in 
Table 5 and then in a brief elaborating section on each actor.26 
                                                        
25 In no particular order, these were: Agricultural ministries (Agriculture, MoLFD, co-operatives); KDB, co-operatives; stockists; 
Land O’Lakes; Egerton University; bets; Dairy training institute; GTZ; KCC; University of Nairobi; MoH-Public health 
department; Kenya Bureau of Standards; DFID; SACDEP; farmers’ advocacy groups; Central Bureau of Statistics; TetraPak; 
Parliament; USAID; traders; feed millers; the police; ILRI; SDP; small mobile milk traders; dairy processors; KARI; farmers; 
advocacy NGOs; consumers; the media; Amos Omore; Nick Hooton; Bill Thorpe; John Kutwa; Mr Muriuki; Director of Livestock 
Production; Mr. Gichohi (Director of Livestock Production 1996); Action Aid; SITE; ITDG; IPAR. 
26 N.B. These descriptions of behaviour change were an output produced by participants at the case study workshop. In the 
subsequent analysis, these descriptions have been triangulated against findings from other components of the case study, 
and the text descriptions and analysis may therefore differ. 
  
Figure 1: The behavioural change map 
 
Early 1990s Before 1996 1996 (before SDP) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Early 2003 Mid 2003 Late 2003 Early 2004 Mid 2004 (i) Mid 2004 (ii) Late 2004 2005 – The present  
(at time of the workshop)
Ministries  
of 
Agriculture, 
Livestock, 
Co-op
Did not support small-
scale milk trader, 
regarded itself as sole 
service provider, still 
supporting co-operative / 
KCC approach, traditional 
mindset despite impact 
of SAPs & policy change.
MoLFD (1996/97), 
Committee established to 
work on Dairy Act.
MoLFD, Progressive 
Director of Livestock 
Production supported 
ideas from SDP.
New director passively 
supporting dairy reform.
Dairy Policy Forum. Dairy Bill submitted to 
reconstituted technical 
committee.
New PS for Livestock 
appointed & gets 
involved in revision of 
Dairy Industry Bill.
Supports small-scale milk traders.
Uses research to inform policy. 
Focuses on policy & regulation. 
Actively encourages other service 
providers. Actively supports 
revitalisation of co-ops. 
KARI Early 1990s, incorporated 
on-farm research in on-
going projects.
More focus on crops & 
soil sciences, a shift 
towards technology 
transfer, pure / more lab 
& ﬁeld station based 
research.
Late 1990s, introduced 
purely technology 
transfer programme  
(like ATIRI).
KARI Director saves Policy 
Forum.
More on-farm ﬁeld activities.
Bigger focus on livestock research 
activities.
KDB KDB acts as agency of 
KCC, & pursues informal 
traders vigorously 
conﬁscating milk & 
taking to KCC for their 
‘accounts’, up to 1992.
KDB invite private 
processors to sit on 
their board, effectively 
replacing KCC. From post 
KCC.
Dominated by processor 
inﬂuence on Board. 
Harassing hawkers. 
Refusing to license 
traders. Refuse to accept 
informal role.
FAO TCP on restructuring 
KDB-consultant consulted 
with SDP. Retrenchment 
& changes in skill base 
(clerks to professionals)
(cont. 2002-2004). 
Letter from new technical 
services manager in 
2002 killed PH technical 
committee (attend of FAO 
TCP).
New MD appointed & 
is soon involved in safe 
milk campaign with 
processors, TetraPak, 
MoH & LoL.
Safe Milk Campaign 
fronted by KDB.
KDB issuing licences for 
mobile traders handling 
20 litres or more.
KDB leading inclusion of 
pro-informal milk market 
policies in Dairy Bill (June 
2004 – February 2005).
KDB order SDP cans 
from Kaluworks for their 
ofﬁces.
PS sends back 2nd-last 
draft of Dairy Bill for 
further elaboration of 
pro-poor informal milk 
policies (October 2004).
Leading inclusion of pro-poor informal 
market in policy process. 
Licensing mobile traders & groups.
Prepared to accept new board 
structure with elected (not nominated) 
members. Not harassing hawkers. 
Actively involved in SITE project.
Advocacy 
NGOs
Few, isolated, clear 
advocacy roles, limited 
link with government. 
High level organisation, 
limited link with grass-
roots groups.
Increased number & 
networking.
Better efforts to co-
ordinate activities & 
organise link with grass 
root groups.
Trying to work with 
government-partnership 
(government appear to be 
pro reform).
NGOs get more 
involved in dairy policy 
inﬂuencing.
ITDG organised meeting 
with Minister of Labour 
(possibility suggested of 
legal challenge to Safe 
Milk Campaign).
ITDG organised 
meeting with Minister 
of Livestock; results in 
ofﬁcial sanction for  
Policy Forum.
More in number. Better networked.
Role is less clear & changing. 
Emerging of public-private 
partnerships. Better links with 
grassroots organisations.
Farmers: 
Dairy 
production, 
Advocacy
Disempowered, poorly 
managed organisation, 
less commercially 
focused, waited for public 
services-info & services, 
older & conservative, 
milk marketing through 
co-ops.
Increased used of local 
bulls.
1998/1999, increased 
use of AI (private).
Start seeking informtion 
& services. Inﬂux of 
young & new farmers 
– commercially focused
Start selling milk through 
emerging channels 
(gradually).
Increased awareness of 
rights.
Increased awareness of rights (e.g. 
legal rights/co-ops). Better managed 
organisations. More commercially 
focused. Actively seeking 
information, technology & services.
Younger & better informed. Using 
greater choice in marketing outlets.
MoH, PH 
Department
Law applied inﬂexibly-re 
premises. Licensing did 
not require PH approval.
Laws still present are implemented 
ﬂexibly, since clear poverty levels 
preclude more stringent regulations.
KDB licence requires recom-
mendation from PH ofﬁce. Keen on 
training traders.
Consumers High demand for raw 
milk.
Some increase in 
processed milk 
consumed, following LoL 
activities supporting milk 
consumption.
Lack of change from 
customers.
Some consumers prefer 
not to buy milk from 
small-scale traders.
Most consumers happy to buy milk 
from small-scale traders.
Processors Less aggressive, 
copying KCC monopoly 
conﬁdence.
Proliferation of dairy 
marketing agents 
(advertising to  
encourage people to 
drink more milk).
1998-1999, more support 
to regulation against raw 
milk market.
Late 1990s, use of 
cheaper packaging.
Processors fund the Safe 
Milk Campaign.
Focus on marketing 
beneﬁts of processed 
milk c.f. dangers of  
raw milk.
More aggressive marketing.
SSMVs Active, pay bribes not 
cess, all milk in plastic 
jerry cans, operate 
3-5 am, suspicious of 
authority & intervention.
Good networks of 
informal traders, 
operating from 3-5 am 
to avoid harassment. All 
ﬁnished by 8 am when 
government ofﬁcers on 
the case, bribes paid.
1996-2000, traders 
improve over years of 
experience.
Traders now pay cess to 
KDB rather than bribes to 
people who harass them.
Trained traders follow 
guidelines though new 
‘baddies’ coming in.
Traders form groups that 
are now licensed by PH & 
KDB; can access credit.
Traders in pilot areas 
starting to request cans.
Forming groups. Seeking cans.
Seeking licences. Paying less.
N.B. Still new ‘baddies’.
Operating freely / talking to ofﬁcials.
Changes in 
SDP
1999, SDP Phase I ended.
Project increased 
geographical coverage.
Change goal / purpose 
recognising importance 
of institutional impact 
relative to direct farmers.
Phase III log frame goal 
& purpose target policy 
/ institutional change. 
Public health workshop 
started to proﬁle debate 
on informal market.
January 2003, policy 
strategy workshop.
Respond to Safe Milk 
Campaign, together with 
advocacy partners.
SDP management asked 
KARI director to be 
convenor of Policy Forum. 
He directed that KDB 
must also be co-hosts.
Dairy Policy Forum.
Changes 
in External 
Environment
Removal of KCC 
monopoly.
Collapse of KCC. More 
liberal media.
Mobile phones 
introduced in Kenya.
Increased citizen voice. January 2003, change in 
government.
Public reaction against 
Safe Milk Campaign.
Changes in 
DFID
Livelihoods approach, 
more holistic 
programmes.
1998-1999, emphasis on 
policies institutions & 
processes.
Table 5: Behavioural change of key stakeholders
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KDB 
Behavioural changes are most significant in the KDB, the current regulator of the industry, which has 
changed the way it implements current legislation related to licensing SSMVs. It is now prepared to 
licence mobile traders handling more than 20 litres of milk per day and by admission of its own 
officers, no longer harasses these traders as it did before. KDB also now promotes the ‘SDP milk cans’ 
(which had been developed in collaboration with the traders to suit their needs) as an example of what 
traders should be using to store and transport raw milk. Previously KDB had been opposed to the use of 
these cans, even though the only practical alternatives for SSMVs were plastic containers, which raised 
far greater concerns. KDB is also now working in partnership with SITE to pilot the provision of training 
and licensing for SSMVs through business development services. KDB is also working with ITDG, 
another of SDP’s previous advocacy partners, to support small-scale dairy enterprises. 
 
More generally, there is a clear change in the way KDB officials relate to the informal sector, with more 
emphasis on bringing traders into the regulatory system, and supporting them to sell quality milk. 
KDB’s Corporate Strategic Plan for 2005-2009 talks of ways to ‘improve the skills of informal traders in 
milk handling and processing and transform them into formal market players’. A specific part of the 
strategy is to work in partnership with other stakeholders to develop training curricula and materials for 
different categories of milk traders, in particular through accrediting service providers to carry out this 
training. Changes in attitudes and behaviours are reported not only at the central level but also at 
provincial and district levels. However, the extent to which officials’ behaviour is changing, and the 
impact on different small-scale actors in the industry, is the subject of ongoing research being carried 
out by ILRI and its partners. Only time will tell whether there really is a long-term change in 
implementation and behaviour within the KDB. It has set targets for collection of licence and cess fees, 
although cess fees rely on traders and processors’ own declaration of sales. But interacting with SSMVs 
is more difficult than with the larger formal sector players. KDB claims to have trained and licensed 
around 1,000 SSMVs so far throughout Kenya, but with an estimated 40,000 SSMVs, there is a long 
way to go. Continued changes within KDB will clearly depend on the progress of the underlying policy 
and legislation described above. 
 
MoLFD 
As well as their involvement in the development of the new Dairy Policy and Bill, government officials in 
the MoLFD have shown significant changes in their attitudes and behaviour, including support for the 
informal market traders. The Livestock Permanent Secretary personally triggered the recognition of 
informal milk traders in the proposed Dairy Bill revision, when he sent back the Bill for alterations to 
include more specific recognition of informal traders. 
 
KEBS 
The Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) provides the dairy sector with relevant standards and codes of 
practice on production and marketing of milk, and provides training for public sector staff. Whilst KEBS 
still insist that all players in the dairy sub-sector, including the informal sector, should comply with 
Kenyan Dairy standards, they now support KDB in developing the informal sector and have given KDB a 
special mandate to deal with the informal sector, while KEBS inspectors concentrate on the large 
industrial processors.  
 
Other government agents: District Public Health Officers 
District Public Health Officers are also now involved in the training and licensing of SSMVs together 
with the KDB. 
 
Dairy processors 
The dairy processors and packaging companies had been among the most vociferous opponents of 
change in the regulations affecting raw milk marketing. Their aggressive attacks on the SSMVs had 
been the trigger to the Milk War and the subsequent exchange of opinions in the media. However, the 
processors have now changed their marketing strategy to focus much more on the value and safety of 
processed, packaged milk for consumers, without overtly attacking the SSMVs. Some processors are 
also starting initiatives with SSMVs, encouraging them to trade in processed products. 
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SSMVs 
Some SSMVs can now access training in basic milk testing and hold KDB licences. Certified SSMVs 
work freely and can better develop their business. As a result, some report higher incomes due to less 
milk spoilage. Untrained SSMVs are seeking to be trained and certified by KDB. Many are starting to 
organise into groups to share costs, although whether such organisation can progress into structures 
that increase the ‘voice’ of traders in the policy process remains to be seen. It may also be that in the 
longer term, the licence and cess fees involved may be a disincentive for some traders, when they 
weigh up the benefits of complying with regulations against the risk of paying fines or bribes if caught 
unlicensed. 
 
Farmers, consumers and the public 
Various instances of articles and letters in the media and contributions at public meetings have 
indicated that there has been a significant change in behaviour towards the informal milk market. This 
may not actually be a change in attitude, as the vast majority of people already purchased milk from 
this sector. But the proposals to move along a path of dairy development that is inclusive of the 
SSMVs, and supports livelihoods and jobs in the sector, have clearly struck a chord with most 
commentators and the public in general, and people now talk much more openly about the issues. 
Also, farmers have become increasingly vocal during stakeholder meetings to argue that policy should 
support the informal marketing channels that they depend on, and that KDB should represent the 
interests of the whole industry, especially small-scale farmers. 
 
Donors 
Donor-funded activities in the sector now tend to be more explicit about the role of the informal sector 
in dairy development (e.g. the support given by GTZ for the passage of the revised Dairy Bill). 
 
In sum 
In sum, the key changes in attitudes and behaviour towards the informal dairy sector are: 
• inclusion and regulation of the informal market in the new Dairy Policy and Dairy Bill; 
• broader stakeholder representation (possibly including the informal sector) on the KDB Board has 
been written into the new Dairy Policy and Bill; 
• SSMVs can be trained and certified by the KDB, and can then pursue their business freely, whilst 
paying for a license and cess; 
• there has been a general change in attitudes and behaviour of key industry actors, as well as the 
general public, towards the role of the raw milk traders; 
• new donor-funded initiatives incorporate informal trade as an issue. 
3.5.2 SDP impact on key industry stakeholders 
After having completed and discussed the list of key stakeholders and changes in their attitudes and 
behaviour, it became clear that the Safe Milk Campaign was a pivotal moment. This is not to 
underestimate the importance of the preceding years of communicating information and gradual 
changing of mindsets, but the Safe Milk Campaign proved to be a ‘tipping point’, and as such, a key 
event. Participants were asked to identify which behaviour changes had contributed to this event, and 
how this event had influenced subsequent events, and these were marked up on the map. The 
combined ‘Wall Map’ and key ‘Causal Effects’ can be seen in Figure 2.  
 
 
  
Figure 2: Causal factors 
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The relationships and behavioural changes highlighted before, during and after the Safe Milk 
Campaign (2) were as follows (numbers relate to the effects shown in Figure 2):  
• The removal of KCC monopoly (24) resulted in the collapse of KCC. This resulted in the proliferation 
of other private processors, which were invited to join the KDB Board. It also resulted in a 
proliferation of SSMVs, which then became the target of the KDB (25), and encouraged the 
processors to support the Safe Milk Campaign (26), but also provided more milk marketing options 
for farmers (27), as did the emergence of new processors. 
• With the inception of SDP, a collaborative approach to research, involving ministry staff (1), was 
necessary for the results of SDP research to feed into ministry policy processes. It was a two-way 
process – ministry involvement also informed the content of the research. The results of the 
research throughout the research phase of the project fed through into knowledge and attitudes 
(though possibly not into behaviour without other factors) among staff in MoLD, KDB, processors 
and others (35). 
• SDP’s continuous provision of information about the scale and role of the informal market and the 
role of the SSMVs contributed to an increased awareness among processors that an improvement 
in the quality of the product provided by SSMVs might present a real threat to them. This 
contributed to the Safe Milk Campaign (2). The processors were also influenced by farmers starting 
to sell more milk though informal channels (3), a proliferation of traders (4), and the fact that milk 
quality became a big public issue (5). The Land O’Lakes media campaign to increase milk 
consumption and the support they received from the new Director of KDB (20) also played a role. 
• In response to the Safe Milk Campaign (6), SDP asked ITDG to organise a meeting with the Minister 
of Labour (7) to discuss the possibility of a legal challenge to the Safe Milk Campaign. SDP also 
launched a media and information campaign to inform the public response to the Safe Milk 
Campaign (13), which then encouraged the dairy processors to change their strategy towards 
positive advertising of processed milk rather than negative advertising about the dangers of raw 
milk (14), and which influenced government attitudes in general (33). 
• SDP asked ITDG to organise a meeting with the Minister of Livestock (8), to encourage him to 
support the Dairy Policy Forum (9). SDP had been working with the Director of KARI to support the 
Forum (10). He insisted that KDB should be fully involved in the Forum, and once SDP had accepted 
this, he helped convince the Minister of Livestock to host the Forum (11), and to instruct (20) the 
KDB to be involved (21).  
• Although KDB was initially reluctant to be involved in the Forum, the effort made by SDP to bring 
them in as an equal partner (which nearly lost the NGO involvement) meant that they then had to 
take the results into account. This led to the reported change in behaviour of KDB field staff (22), 
which in turn led to the reported increase in the number of licensed SSMVs (though is difficult to 
assess accurately whether this is actually the case). 
• Only a small proportion of SSMVs were exposed to training activities supported by SDP, and took 
part in the development of the curriculum and design of milk cans. However, those that did 
indicated significant benefits from their improved understanding of milk hygiene, including lower 
milk spoilage and higher incomes. Those SSMVs who were involved clearly attributed these 
changes to SDP’s activities. 
• SDP’s ability to convince the Director of KARI to support the Forum was partly because the project 
was working directly with KARI (12), but also because SDP staff (particularly the project manager 
from MoLFD) were well connected and politically astute, and knew how to connect with senior 
people using available channels. Changes in attitude and behaviour within a large organisation 
such as KARI are difficult to quantify and to attribute. However, KARI researchers who have worked 
with SDP are proud to be associated with the project. SDP was requested to run a half-day session 
at KARI’s annual conference in 2004 in order to showcase their achievements.  
• SDP’s production of policy briefs for the Forum and their increased interest in policy advocacy 
encouraged NGOs to become involved in the milk trader issue (15). 
• The Minister’s support and offer to host the Forum was essential for it to go ahead (16). The Forum 
took place shortly after Tanzania had passed a similar Dairy Act. This helped to convince 
participants at the Forum of the importance of a new Act in Kenya, and the revival of the process of 
developing the new Dairy Act (17) and the involvement of SDP staff in other donor/government 
processes to support the new bill (18, 19). 
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• More liberal media, increased citizens voice, and improved communications (29) all contributed to 
increased farmers’ voice both directly and indirectly through, and with the help of advocacy NGOs 
(30), and played an increasing role in influencing MoLFD and KDB attitudes and behaviour (31). The 
new government in 2003 was much more open to the voice of citizens and NGOs which provided 
much better access to Ministers and policy makers than they had before, but they also had to 
provide more constructive inputs rather then simply criticising government (32).  
3.5.3 Further behavioural change: Other projects working in the dairy sub-sector in 
Kenya 
Virtually all recent projects in the dairy sub-sector in Kenya have used and cited SDP research results as 
a source of information. Many organisations have also subsequently linked with the SDP implementing 
institutions for new dairy related activities in Kenya, in both service delivery and policy-related areas. 
• The Kenya Dairy Development Project (KDDP) works closely with ILRI to develop their training 
manuals, extension materials and approaches to informal sectors and allows continued 
engagement with the policy making process; 
• IFAD’s Smallholder Dairy Commercialisation Programme used SDP data to fine-tune its target 
activities and investment; 
• SITE, which was one of SDP’s advocacy partners, is now working closely with KDB and ILRI to 
develop their training manuals and to support development of small-scale business development 
services for milk traders; 
• GTZ’s Promotion of Private Sector Development in Agriculture (PSDA) project supported the process 
of revising and passing the new Dairy Bill, following commitments made at SDP’s Dairy Policy 
Forum. This is a result of consultation with SDP, following the GTZ representative’s attendance at 
the Dairy Policy Forum, and thus can be seen as an SDP achievement in attracting other donors to 
engage in the informal dairy sector activities. 
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4 Analysis and Reflection: What Changed and Why?  
ODI’s RAPID programme has developed a framework to help researchers and policy entrepreneurs 
understand the role that research-based evidence plays in influencing pro-poor policy processes. The 
four components of this CEL framework – Context, Evidence, Links, and External Environment – can 
provide the user with valuable in-depth information regarding policy windows, key policy actors and 
networks, gaps in the existing evidence, alternative means of communication, and trends and changes 
in the external environment. Unfortunately, addressing all these issues can prove a daunting task. 
However, this tool can be used to ease the process as it presents some of the key questions that the 
researcher or policy entrepreneur should answer when examining critical factors leading to policy 
impact. Further details on the RAPID framework and the key questions can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
In this section, the four CEL components of the process leading to policy change, and SDP’s role in this, 
will be assessed by answering the key relevant framework questions and linking them with the changes 
in dairy policy and practice, the project’s external events and internal project changes. The focus of this 
analysis is inevitably on the role of SDP and its partners in the policy change, as the ROA methodology 
focused on these actors. This analysis is based on evidence from the ROA process, including workshop 
descriptions of the policy changes and reasons, and the interviews with key actors that followed. 
4.1 The policy context: politics and institutions 
4.1.1 General political context 
Following independence in 1963, despite the government’s initial measures to include previously 
marginalised indigenous Kenyans in the commercial economy and policy processes, Kenya’s political 
system became rigid, conservative and unresponsive to change until the arrival into power of NARC in 
December 2002. NARC introduced the Economic Recovery Strategy and the Strategy for the 
Revitalisation of Agriculture, which allows for greater possibilities for change in policy. In 2003, the 
newly elected government encouraged parliamentarians to seek new roles in overseeing the changes in 
policy processes, after they had begun to make changes to the political and socio-economic aspects of 
the country. Whilst some may argue that little has yet changed in the way government and policy 
making actually works, there has undoubtedly been a change in perception and expectations of 
Kenyans. The policy advocacy activities of SDP’s partners took place against this changing background 
and feeling that the government has to listen to its citizens’ voice. In this respect, the political context 
post-2002 provided more space and opportunity for policy change at the time of SDP’s more active 
policy influencing activities, although these themselves built on the previous policy-influencing 
activities. 
 
However, there are some issues concerning the sustainability of the changes. The plans for 
development of fewer, broad-based Acts governing agriculture could, in theory, derail the changes that 
have occurred in the new Dairy Bill. During development of such new legislation, the interests of the 
formal sector are likely to emerge and similar battles may need to be fought again. However, in reality, 
the development of such a new legislative framework does not seem imminent and, in the meantime, if 
progress is made with implementation of the new Dairy Bill, the principles of stakeholder involvement 
and development of the informal market should become more established. 
 
This raises the importance of continued monitoring of the situation, with lobbying where appropriate, 
to ensure momentum is maintained. Now that the SDP project has finished, it can no longer play the 
coordinating role. Although its research and advocacy partners are still there, working together in some 
instances, it is questionable as to how well they will be able to carry on such lobbying. 
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4.1.2 Civil society roles and citizen voice 
Some background to the changing role and activities of CSOs in Kenya may help to understand why 
they were able to be such key partners to SDP during its policy influencing activities. As mentioned 
above, there had been significant changes in the role of citizen voice in the policy process in Kenya 
from the time the project started. In particular, the role of CSOs, especially advocacy-focused 
organisations, changed significantly from being small, disconnected organisations, with limited links 
to citizens at the grassroots, to being well-organised, collaborating and influential organisations which 
more effectively linked grassroots voices with decision-makers. 
 
The reasons for this change are quite complex and were discussed by actors during the ROA 
workshops. Two key reasons suggested were: (i) increased donor support of CSOs in the mid-late 
1990s; and (ii) the Kenya Constitutional Review process – the CSOs played a key role in this process 
and strengthened their links both with grassroots citizen groups and with policy makers. Because of 
changes in the political context, NGOs themselves had more space for influencing policy makers, and 
had better links with grassroots organisations. By 2003-2004, with the advent of the new government, 
some of SDP’s CSO partners were able to call meetings with government ministers at short notice, 
whilst the SDP research partners were still limited to going through formal procedures to reach policy 
makers. The CSOs were also very willing to engage in controversial advocacy in support of their clients, 
whilst the SDP research partners were limited mainly to presentation of evidence. 
 
SDP chose to link with CSOs in its policy influencing activities, mainly because they had identified 
capacities there that were lacking in the existing SDP partner institutions,27 and institutional difficulties 
in engaging in direct policy influencing. But the decision by SDP to work closely with such advocacy-
focused CSOs took advantage of these changes in the role of civil society and were crucial in getting 
across the policy messages that came from SDP research. As well as opportunities for meeting with 
ministers, this also worked in indirect ways. The high-profile advocacy and more open use of the media 
that the NGOs were able to engage in, together with ActionAid’s ability to link the smallholder farmer 
advocacy group they supported to SDP’s evidence, meant that the public, and farmers in particular, 
were able to put increased pressure directly on the KDB and on their MPs for changes. For example, an 
MP who spoke at the Policy Forum stated how farmers in his constituency had lobbied him about milk 
marketing problems. Given the context of improving citizen voice described above, these kinds of 
voices turned out to be a very powerful influence. 
4.1.3 Representation in the dairy policy process 
The reality of dairy production, marketing and consumption, as shown in SDP’s characterisations, is 
predominantly driven by consumer demand. This may seem an obvious point, but it had been ignored 
by many actors in the policy process. Consumers not only show a clear demand for unprocessed milk, 
based on affordability, availability and taste, but also show an awareness of and ability to deal with 
possible health risks by boiling their milk. This demand in turn has supported the maintenance of a 
strong market for unprocessed milk with a variety of market agents, including the SSMVs. And in turn, 
the majority of smallholder dairy producers sell their milk into this market for unprocessed milk, whilst 
others sell through chains that supply the processors. 
 
However, representation in the key dairy industry bodies, particularly the Board of KDB, does not reflect 
this spectrum of stakeholders. The current membership is dominated by larger-scale producers and 
formal sector representatives. There is no consumer representation, nor any representatives from the 
informal sector. Small-scale farmers also claim that those producers who are on the board do not 
represent their interests.  
 
                                                        
27 SDP capacity weaknesses, as identified at the 2003 Policy Strategy Workshop, included: (i) Capacity to communicate 
effectively with a range of stakeholders; (ii) Ability to strengthen capacities of traders and farmers to advocate for themselves; 
(iii) Ability to institutionalise the involvement of key stakeholders in the policy process; (iv) Ability to understand linkages 
between dairy sector and other sectors and livelihood issues. 
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The KDB’s mandate is to regulate and develop the dairy industry and they are funded mainly through 
cess, licenses and levies – only about 30% of their budget is from the government.28 Because they only 
recognised the formal sector, they could only collect licence fee, levy and cess from the formal sector 
producers, processors and traders, who, in turn, lobbied to stamp out their ‘unfair’ competitors: the 
informal sector. As well as being much better represented in the policy making process, the processors 
and packaging manufacturers are also extremely well resourced, and were able to devote large 
amounts of money towards efforts to expand their market share. Given this current make-up of the KDB 
Board, and the difficulty for the majority of smallholder farmers, small-scale traders and consumers to 
get their voice heard, it is clear that the majority of stakeholders in the Kenyan dairy sector do not 
currently play a role in the policy process. Whilst there was a stakeholder policy consultative process 
included in the development of the draft Dairy Industry Bill, it is not clear to what extent the interests of 
the small-scale actors were actually taken on board, when they conflicted with the interests of the more 
powerful actors. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the policy environment did not reflect 
the reality of the sector. This is not to ignore the issue of quality control and health risks in the 
unprocessed milk sector, but makes the point that the reality and driving forces behind the largest part 
of the dairy sector would have been difficult for the KDB Board to fully understand without including 
representation from this sector. 
 
The resistance to evidence-based policy making that would favour the informal sector was therefore 
rooted in a conflict of interest between the large processors and packagers, and the informal sector 
players (SSMVs, farmers who supplied them, and consumers who buy milk from them). The informal 
sector, which dominates the production and marketing of milk in Kenya, is considered by the big 
processors to be operating on the basis of unfair competition.  
 
This skewing of influence towards the interests of larger private-sector actors in the dairy sector meant 
that any evidence that challenged these interests was likely to be strongly resisted, and this was 
indeed found to be the case once SDP started to publicise its research findings. Nevertheless, SDP and 
its partners continued to push this evidence, and to develop an alternative model for the sector, which 
included proposals that would change the representation structure of KDB itself.29  
 
The proposed transformation of the main regulatory body to become a truly representative, 
stakeholder-run organisation, would, if it occurs, significantly change this context of representation in 
the policy process. However, the challenges to these changes in representation should not be 
underestimated. Whilst farmer organisations are becoming more involved in the policy process, and 
smallholder farmer advocacy clearly played a role in the changes seen, there remains little if any 
organisation of small-scale traders, and still no active consumer organisation. Development of small-
scale trader groups is being supported by some of SDP’s partners but it is unclear how representation 
in the stakeholder bodies will occur. It is likely that a substantial effort will be needed for training and 
capacity building for the informal sector and the SSMVs. 
4.2 Evidence: relevance, credibility and communication 
It seems clear that research-based evidence has played a major role in the changes in attitudes and 
practices that have taken place in the dairy sector. As well as the entrenched interests described above 
that were seeking to protect their positions, the ‘conventional wisdom’ on dairy industry development 
could at first glance be seen to support their position. Improvements in quality and reduction in health 
risks have in most developed countries taken place through moves towards a cold-chain based 
processed milk model. However, the range, relevance and quality of evidence that SDP research 
produced were used to offer a wholly different paradigm of dairy market development.  
 
It is also clear that SDP was by far the most significant player in the production of evidence from the 
late 1990s to 2004. Whilst other institutions, such as Tegemeo Institute, were producing 
                                                        
28 In 2002-2003, the government contribution to KDB represented 33% of their revenue. ‘Cess’ accounted for 58% of revenue, 
with the remaining 9% coming from licensing and other services (KDB Corporate Strategic Plan for 2005-2009). 
29 The ongoing work with KBD and SITE which pilots a training and licensing system for SSMVs should also contribute to 
bringing these traders more into the policy process. 
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complementary policy research that produced similar findings, these often drew on existing SDP 
research. So this section focuses almost entirely on SDP’s use of evidence. There are many aspects of 
this research, and the way it was obtained and communicated, which seem to have been significant in 
achieving the acceptance of this new paradigm for dairy development. The range of evidence was very 
broad, as outlined in the Box below: findings on consumer demand, the scale of the different marketing 
channels, the low level of actual health risk, ways of improving quality through training, the livelihoods 
and jobs that depended on the informal sector, and the implications of the existing policy environment; 
all combined to produce a convincing picture of the need for change. The relevance and credibility of 
the evidence meant that this picture was difficult for opponents to refute. The evidence was also 
communicated strategically, effectively targeting a range of audiences, and often using innovative 
means. 
 
Box: Summary of relevant evidence supporting policy and institutional reform 
In outline, the evidence and its implications are as follows: 
• Some 800,000 smallholder households depend on dairying for their livelihoods. 
• In addition to this household income, smallholder dairy farms also support over 350,000 full-time wage 
labourers. 
• At least 86% of marketed milk is sold through the informal sector as raw, unpasteurised milk. By extension, 
the vast majority of both farmers and consumers depend on this market. 
• This informal sector accounts for over 70% of the 40,000 jobs in dairy marketing and processing. 
• This informal market pays significantly higher prices to farmers, and sells to consumers at about half the 
price of processed, packaged milk. 
• Access to good nutrition through affordable milk for poor households is very important for child physical and 
cognitive development. 
• The vast majority of Kenyan consumers boil purchased milk before consumption, whether they purchase raw 
or pasteurised milk, thereby massively reducing public health concerns. 
• Licensed milk traders, under current systems, show no significant difference in milk quality compared with 
unlicensed traders, implying that licensing and quality control systems are not working. 
• Training of small-scale milk traders in testing and handling of milk, and use of appropriate containers, leads 
to improvements in milk quality for the consumer. 
4.2.1 Relevance of evidence 
The relevance of the evidence is important. From SDP’s initial research emphasis on technical aspects 
of milk production, the direction of the research was changed to address the key constraints identified 
in the initial characterisations. This change in focus was influenced by DFID’s shift to livelihoods rather 
than just on production, and both the implementing organisations and the donor were flexible enough 
to make this change in the direction of the research. Where there were key areas for technical research, 
these were addressed, most notably in the work that was done to assess the level of public health risk 
associated with different marketing channels and ways of managing the risks that were present. 
Opportunities were also taken to highlight particularly relevant aspects of the evidence where 
appropriate: when the new government stressed that employment generation was the cornerstone of 
its economic recovery strategy, SDP focused on completing and publicising its research on 
employment, and through its advocacy partners was able to deliver these findings directly to the 
Minister of Labour. 
4.2.2 Credibility of evidence 
The credibility of the evidence rested to a large extent on the reputation of the implementing research 
organisations, ILRI and KARI, and on the consistent focus of MoLFD and SDP management on robust 
methodologies and approaches. As major public research institutions, they were seen as unbiased and 
reputable. The quality of research staff ensured high quality research outputs. But the collaborative 
nature of the research and the focus on participatory approaches were also important. The design and 
evaluation of training approaches for SSMVs and the development of appropriate containers was done 
in close collaboration with the SSMVs, so the resulting guidelines and containers were both relevant 
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and appropriate. This evidence also took the arguments beyond identification of issues and problems, 
and showed clear ways forward that policy makers could support, if they were convinced. 
 
The SDP researchers were also very careful to maintain the credibility of their evidence. Thus extreme 
care was taken not to release controversial evidence until they were absolutely sure about particular 
figures and findings, even when SDP’s advocacy partners were starting to engage in public arguments 
and pushing for statements from SDP. This was in marked contrast to ‘evidence’ presented in the Safe 
Milk Campaign by the processors, and associated with the KDB and MoH, apparently intended to 
frighten consumers; statements were made that could not be substantiated. With the comprehensive 
and highly credible evidence of SDP, the advocacy partners were able to very effectively counter the 
processors’ arguments and the campaign was eventually withdrawn. 
4.2.3 Communication of evidence 
Evidence is useless if it is not communicated, and it is through the strategic communication of research 
findings that SDP seems to have been most successful. SDP’s strategy for influencing policy included 
mapping out different targets and producing appropriate communication materials and means of 
delivering them. These ranged from conventional dissemination in scientific meetings and stakeholder 
workshops, through the use of the media to inform the general public, to specific targeting of policy 
makers both directly through policy briefs, and through the advocacy activities of SDP’s partners. 
 
The collaboration between the SDP implementing organisations meant that the MoLFD (as an SDP 
implementing organisation) was fully involved in the research and the findings and implications were 
effectively embedded in the formal policy making process throughout the project, although attempts 
were made at higher levels to block changes. The collaborative nature of the research also meant that 
key stakeholders, including the KDB, were continually aware of the research outputs as they were being 
produced, and in some cases directly involved in the research. For example, KDB collaborated in the 
training of SSMVs, and in this respect could be considered as having some ‘ownership’ of the results.30 
This maintained quality and relevance, as well as ensuring good understanding of the outputs amongst 
these key partners. This was also the case for the key industry organisations which made up SDP’s 
Steering Committee and met quarterly. They were fully briefed on the ongoing research and the findings 
and able to provide input.  
 
The importance of this ongoing communication of evidence throughout the lifetime of SDP, especially 
through the SDP project manager’s office in MoLFD, cannot be underestimated. Over a number of years, 
stakeholders would, in one way or another, continually hear about the research and its implications, so 
that what was initially considered as almost heretical became more widely accepted, if still 
controversial. 
 
Towards the end of the project, specific communication with policy makers was planned through the 
production and use of policy briefs, specifically at the Dairy Policy Forum. It was in this area that SDP’s 
partnership with the advocacy CSOs proved highly important. MoLFD, KARI and ILRI were constrained 
through their institutional mandates to only communicate evidence, and not to advocate for change. In 
addition, the situation was complicated by MoLFD’s role in the later stages of more overt ‘advocacy’, 
when MoLFD (through SDP) was effectively advocating against itself. The institutions were quite aware 
of this issue, and because of it KARI and ILRI had a higher profile in these later activities. Certainly 
when powerful private interests, linked with the KDB and MoH, were aggressively attacking the informal 
sector, with unsubstantiated evidence, there was a clear need for some effective advocacy to counter 
this. Concerned with the livelihoods of poor producers, traders and consumers, the advocacy CSOs 
were able to use SDP’s evidence not only in their press conferences and in their use of the media, but 
also in directly targeting key policy makers. They were able to call face-to-face meetings with the 
Minister of Labour and the Minister of Livestock, and invite SDP researchers to be present to explain 
the evidence, while the advocacy CSOs argued the implications. Key people were always given the 
                                                        
30 In reality this is a little more complex, as when personnel changed with KDB, especially when the new MD was appointed in 
2003, some agreements to collaborate in what were controversial areas were reneged upon. However, the ongoing 
collaboration in the SITE project is now an extension of that earlier KDB collaboration. 
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relevant policy briefs and contact details of the researchers to facilitate follow-up. Other opportunities 
were also taken to provide input to policy makers, including through the connections of SDP’s partner 
IPAR to the parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture, where the opportunity was taken to provide 
the policy briefs and an offer to meet with members. IPAR subsequently became closely involved in 
advising and supporting the work of the committee during 2004. 
 
The culmination of the communication with policy makers came at the Dairy Policy Forum. This high-
level event, attended by the Minister of National Planning and the Minister of Livestock together with 
some 200 stakeholders, was used to communicate the research findings through presentations and a 
video made specifically for the occasion, as well as distribution of policy briefs. Although primarily an 
SDP-led event in collaboration with KDB, the CSO partners played a key role in planning this event. The 
professionally made video, featuring farmers, traders and poor consumers talking about their concerns 
and the issues of importance to them, brought the voice of ordinary stakeholders into this high-level 
forum and proved a powerful back-up to support the implications of the research. Farmers at the Forum 
also engaged in articulate debate with the KDB. This Forum, where SDP was able to gain support from 
key decision-makers and obtain commitments to changes in policy, seems to have been a definite 
tipping point. 
 
Communication to the public was also addressed effectively, through use of the national newspapers 
to publish key research findings and their implications. These pieces were written with care to ensure 
readability without compromising on the robustness of the evidence. Also, in the collaboration 
between the advocacy CSOs and SDP, especially at the time of the Milk War, the newspaper and 
broadcast media provided a hugely important means of getting the advocacy partners’ messages 
across through press conferences and opinion pieces in the press. For some months, the issues 
received wide coverage, and the quality of the evidence meant that most independent articles clearly 
argued from the same perspective as the SDP partners. Without this public reaction, ministers and 
parliamentarians may not have agreed to participate in meetings and lend their support. 
 
In some instances however, SDP had to be much more subtle and careful about communications with 
those they wanted to influence. SDP’s relationship with KDB was critical throughout the project. 
Despite KDB sitting on the Steering Committee, there seemed to be intrinsic biases within key KDB staff 
against the implications of SDP’s research, and despite repeated attempts to meet and rationalise 
differences, key KDB senior staff were extremely hard to reach. SDP’s enthusiastic efforts to push 
forward with the work of the Dairy Public Health Committee also led to tensions. SDP’s strong support 
to their CSO partners’ reaction to the Safe Milk Campaign also led to further deterioration in the 
relationship, when KDB felt they were being openly ‘attacked’. It can be argued that SDP were not 
sensitive enough about the position key people in KDB found themselves in, although it would not 
have been easy to predict the way KDB were going to react. However, in the run up to the Dairy Policy 
Forum, a lot of effort was made to present a much more positive role for KDB as implied by the 
evidence, stressing the key role the Board could play, and acknowledging the extent to which KDB had 
already tried to engage with the informal sector.  
 
In sum, the strategic use of a variety of means to communicate the research findings to different 
audiences seems to have contributed to the clear shift in attitudes and, after the Policy Forum, a 
promised change in written policy.  
4.3 Links 
The dairy sector is a complex sector with many different actors involved. Any intervention, be it the 
process of developing policy or of obtaining information that could inform policy, requires linkages 
between a range of stakeholders. The making and maintaining of effective linkages seems to have been 
very important in the way that changes in attitudes and policy occurred in the sector. 
 
There were frequent dairy industry stakeholder meetings convened by a range of organisations, 
including the KDB, MoLFD, SDP itself, and a range of other organisations. These had always enabled 
particular issues to be aired and discussed, but during the lifetime of SDP, every opportunity was taken 
to use such meetings both to get input into research and to disseminate findings. 
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4.3.1 Collaborative approaches to research 
Reference has already been made to the collaborative nature of SDP’s activities, but this bears closer 
analysis. The three implementing institutions – MoLFD, KARI and ILRI – worked very effectively together. 
This was based on several years of previous collaboration in dairy research at the coast during which 
the collaborating institutions, and key individuals within them, gained experience of working together. 
Each brought different capacities and trusted the other partners to carry out their respective roles. 
 
One absolutely key linkage that existed throughout the project was that the project manager was a 
MoLFD official intimately involved with policy making processes, sitting on drafting committees and in 
close contact with peers responsible for leading these processes. The way this linkage enabled 
evidence to feed continually into the policy process was very important.  
 
The close collaboration with KARI was not only important for the research capacity and expertise that 
was brought, but also in the critical involvement of the influential KARI Director himself, which played a 
key role in ensuring that the Dairy Policy Forum actually took place, at a time when relationships 
between SDP and KDB were extremely tense. 
 
In addition, the SDP Steering Committee acted as a consultative forum for stakeholders in the dairy 
industry. All the major stakeholders were represented and, through their quarterly meetings, had an 
opportunity firstly to influence the way SDP carried out its work, and secondly to learn about the 
findings and implications as they emerged, and to feed back to their institution, even if in small ways. 
Wider collaboration in research activities also brought new partners in, and added to the credibility of 
the evidence, as already discussed. SDP also worked closely with key organisations that could be seen 
as targets. In particular the work on addressing quality and safety in raw milk markets and in training 
SSMVs was done in collaboration with KDB.  
 
Through SDP’s efforts to communicate with stakeholders, and to take part in any relevant stakeholder 
meetings, there were frequent opportunities to make further linkages and contribute to processes, 
including being asked to sit on various committees, such as the Public Health Committee (convened by 
the KDB and chaired by MoLFD) following presentation of the public health research findings. 
4.3.2 Links with advocacy partners 
SDP’s creation of links with advocacy partners has already been referred to, and can be seen as an 
extremely effective collaboration. However, these linkages required a lot of work to establish and 
maintain. They were made because the advocacy partners brought completely different capacities, 
ways of working and mandates. But by their very nature they are different organisations from the SDP 
research partners, working in different ways, and with different criteria for judging success. None of the 
CSO partners had a particular focus on the dairy sector. So why were these links made and how were 
they maintained?  
 
There is an important link here to the focus of SDP’s research, which was on the livelihoods of those 
involved in the dairy sector, in particular the poor. The CSOs themselves had missions to work in 
various ways to improve poor people’s livelihoods. The complete picture of how existing policies and 
institutions were damaging to poor people’s livelihoods in the sector, and the potential benefits to the 
poor offered by the new paradigm that the evidence supported, meant that SDP became a useful 
partner to the CSOs in achieving their own objectives, while at the same time they were helping SDP to 
achieve its objectives. So whilst they worked in different ways, SDP and the advocacy partners shared a 
vision. The practical benefits of these linkages in influencing the policy process have already been 
discussed in the previous section. ITDG organised meetings with Ministers of Labour and Livestock and 
IPAR facilitated links to gain support from parliamentarians. Through these direct linkages to policy 
makers, and also through ActionAid’s and SITE’s effective links to grassroots farmer organisations and 
traders, SDP’s sphere of influence was significantly expanded. SDP was also able to take more of a 
back seat in many advocacy activities, playing a catalytic and facilitating role, responsible for 
presenting and explaining the evidence itself, which was consistent with the institutional constraints 
and mandates of the implementing organisations. 
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On a practical note, the making and maintaining of links requires time and effort. With a budget for 
policy-influencing activities, SDP was able to support most of the collaborative activities that they 
carried out with their advocacy partners. Importantly, the DFID Assistant Professional Officer (APO) who 
was working to support the policy influencing activities was able to devote considerable time to 
maintaining these links. 
 
Figure 3 shows a representation of the strategy used by SDP to communicate findings through 
collaborative research, partnership in communication, and advocacy. 
 
Figure 3: SDP strategy for communicating research findings 
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political context, termed the ‘policies, institutions and processes’ (PIP) aspects of livelihood outcomes. 
This new emphasis, which DFID started using increasingly from 1998, resulted in the change of focus of 
SDP Phase III to policy advocacy.31 It is likely that without this influence on the direction of the project 
there would have been far less active engagement in policy influencing and, arguably, far less impact 
on policy, even if the evidence was still as livelihoods-focused.  
 
There seems to have been a two-way influence here. As well as concentrating on policies, DFID was 
moving away from funding projects, and as described earlier, SDP had to fight to resist closure. But 
once the decision not to close was made, DFID supported SDP in its attempts to engage with the policy 
process. And in turn, once the policy influencing activities started, the DFID APO regularly made efforts 
to feed back the lessons to DFID both at country level and centrally, including at the annual advisers’ 
conferences. These lessons included the importance of robust livelihoods-relevant evidence in 
controversial policy debates. This study has not assessed the degree to which thinking or practice 
within DFID has changed as a result of the SDP experience, but SDP is widely quoted within DFID as a 
success story in influencing policy, and it is not unreasonable to assume that lessons have been taken 
on board. 
 
Other processes going on at the same time also had influence. An FAO technical co-operation project 
(TCP) was supporting the restructuring of the KDB and building its capacity to carry out its important 
functions. Although the project personnel were not as supportive of pro-informal sector change as were 
SDP and its partners, significant changes were made in KDB’s systems of operation, to reflect the 
reality of the sector, including training of some informal sector traders, and better representation of 
stakeholders in the KDB. Overall, this project led to important improvements in the way KDB operated.  
 
External influences on the policy process are continuing in the form of donor support (from GTZ) to the 
development of the new Dairy Bill and Policy, based on the revisions stemming from the Dairy Policy 
Forum. 
                                                        
31 Similar changes in emphasis were seen in other DFID-funded projects around this time, for example in the Decentralised 
Livestock Services in Eastern Indonesia (DELIVERI) project – see www.deliveri.org. 
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Lessons on how to achieve pro-poor policy impact 
5.1.1 Collaboration 
A common statement from the interviews with some of the key players in dairy industry was that ‘SDP is 
the first collaborative project in Kenya that worked smoothly and harmoniously’. One interviewee 
added that: ‘Experience from other collaborative projects was that such a project will disintegrate into 
two or three sub-projects which will meet only when a project review is imminent’. This statement 
highlights the necessity of the high degree of collaboration required, and which occurred between the 
partner institutions within SDP. This was in turn based on several years of previous KARI/ILRI 
collaboration in research at the coast, including with links to the MoLFD. Without undermining the 
project’s dynamics and also acknowledging that there are tensions and frictions between collaborating 
institutions (as would be expected in any collaborative project), this good collaboration can be seen 
as a contributing factor to the success of SDP in achieving policy change.  
 
A characteristic of the SDP was that very few of SDP’s staff were actually employed by SDP. Only the 
support staff and research technicians were employed by SDP and worked for the project full time; the 
managers, researchers and other senior positions within SDP combined other research and other 
activities with their SDP work. The senior members of staff maintained their positions in their 
respective parent institutions and were remunerated by their parent institutions. This arrangement had 
the benefit that SDP staff could still work for their parent institutions and thus act as ‘people from the 
inside’ to communicate SDP research results and advocate SDP opinions to decision-makers and other 
actors in their respective parent institutions. 
 
Another significant aspect of collaboration was the good relationship established with the SSMVs. This 
was an achievement because initially the SSMVs were very suspicious of anyone who tried to work 
together with them. Project members of staff were able to break the ice, gain and maintain their 
trust. Assigning a specific person or specific people to work with a specific community and to 
work with them very closely is a good approach to replicate. 
5.1.2 From research to policy 
SDP spent four years conducting research on various aspects of the dairy sector and produced the most 
up-to-date and most comprehensive understanding of this sector. SDP publications are still referred to 
today by decision-makers and researchers in Kenya’s dairy industry. The research was rigorous and 
comprehensive, so much so that the research findings are still uncontested. All of these factors are very 
important in ensuring that SDP partners (especially the advocacy CSOs) are still interested in 
championing the cause initiated by SDP, and that the policy influencing process occurs smoothly – 
uncontested evidence means that ‘opponents’ to change have little option but to accept the 
implications of SDP’s research. 
 
SDP was able to produce credible and comprehensive research because it started as a research and 
development project, consequently the scientifically sound and high standard research results were 
used as a basis in the decision-making process about the informal milk market. To base the project 
within two reputable research organisations meant that SDP enjoyed high credibility in the scientific 
community. The quality of the research conducted by SDP had to be up to the standard maintained by 
both research institutions. 
 
By the time SDP began to engage with policy, it already had the best knowledge of the dairy sub-sector 
in Kenya. It is doubtful whether the evidence the project collected would be as rigorous and 
thorough if SDP had not started as an R&D project or whether it would have been able to achieve 
policy change if it had been set up as an advocacy project from the very beginning. In this respect, 
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an initial clear focus on R&D, before an emphasis on policy influencing may be a good avenue to 
achieving policy change. 
5.1.3 A forum for the dairy industry 
The SDP Steering Committee consisted of representatives of almost all major stakeholders in the dairy 
sub-sector, therefore it was basically a forum for representatives of the dairy industry to meet quarterly. 
All SDP findings were presented to and endorsed by the Project Steering Committee (PSC). This 
provided SDP with good opportunities to consult with the key stakeholders before they presented 
research results to the scientific community or to the general public. The PSC was also very useful in 
helping SDP to determine the research focus and research topics. Having a Steering Committee 
consisting of representatives of all stakeholders is a good lesson worth replicating for other projects. 
 
Presentation of the research findings was not only limited to key stakeholders of the dairy industry; 
they were also communicated in several different forums using different methods of presentation. For 
the scientific community, SDP used journals and various scientific meetings, where research results 
were included in the proceedings, to convey their message. For policy makers and other dairy industry 
stakeholders, SDP used policy briefs, audio-visual material and other forms of presentation, such as 
scientific fora and public debate in local media. For the general population, SDP used mass media such 
as newspaper articles written in popular language to present the research findings.  
 
Other forums were also set up following presentation of SDP research, such as the Public Health 
Committee, which looked at specific aspects of public health in the industry. The Policy Forum was the 
culmination of SDP’s efforts to influence policy. In this Forum SDP and its advocacy CSOs were able to 
show their success in empowering the farmers and traders themselves to make a case for development 
of the informal sector. The ability of empowered farmers and SSMVs to speak on behalf of their 
colleagues in person at the Dairy Policy Forum in May 2004 proved to be the most compelling 
factor in successfully changing the decision-makers’ opinion about the need to recognise and 
develop the informal sector.  
5.1.4 Working with CSOs  
SDP was successful in adopting a facilitating role, and played on the strengths of both the project and 
its advocacy CSO partners to make policy change. The three collaborating institutions that made up the 
SDP could not be seen to represent a different view point from that of the government and to engage in 
active policy debate without following established bureaucratic procedures. To link with advocacy 
CSOs who could champion the need to acknowledge the informal sector in dairy industry was a good 
strategy and worth replicating.  
 
The advocacy CSOs were not paid by the SDP. They all agreed to be involved because their institutions 
also had similar mandates, specifically poverty alleviation, strengthening SMEs, and empowering 
grassroots-level organisations. The coalition really came to life when it had to contend with the specific 
issue of the Safe Milk Campaign that they perceived as threatening the informal sector and the 
livelihoods of those who depend on it. The CSO advocacy partners appreciated the role played by the 
credible evidence supplied by the SDP to back up their own advocacy. 
 
However, to raise the interest and to maintain the commitment of such organisations requires a lot of 
time and resources. SDP was lucky to have a full time DFID APO who was committed to doing this job. A 
part-time staff member would not have been able to achieve the same impact. This coordination was 
very demanding of time, and retaining a person or a team to coordinate policy advocacy work 
seems to be a necessity. 
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5.1.5 Multiple approaches 
SDP enjoyed the opportunity to engage with a multi-stakeholder and multi-level approach. It was able 
to connect with farmers (producers) in the field, up to decision-makers at the national level, to talk 
about issues in dairy development. It was also able to work with various stakeholders in dairy 
industry through the PSC and various other fora. This is considered to have been more effective 
than if SDP had only been able to work through a single channel. 
 
SDP’s ability to present its findings in different formats and different media was another key to 
the success of the policy-influencing activities. Their ability to present their case and to give a 
counter-argument to the opposing opinion was vital to achieving a change in policy. SDP was able to 
maintain its collaborating partners’ mandates whilst still engaging in policy-oriented dialogue – this is 
a good strategy to replicate. 
 
The effective relationships and good alliances between the project’s collaborators and partners 
attracted other institutions (projects, CSOs and donors) to work with SDP’s implementing 
organisations. A significant degree of effort was invested by SDP to maintain their interest and to 
keep them on board – such efforts require a good allocation of staff and resources. However, SDP’s 
experience here is not necessarily the best example for replication as there was very few written 
strategies for such engagement. Some aspects of collaboration were more opportunistic rather than 
strategic, although SDP’s flexibility and strategic alliances already in place enabled prompt response to 
opportunities when they arose – in effect part of the strategy was to be well placed to take advantage of 
opportunities as they arose. 
5.1.6 Importance of individuals 
Notwithstanding the importance of collaboration, the personalities and positions of people managing 
the SDP were important. For example, the Project Manager from the MoLFD was another key to the 
success of the project because he had direct access to decision-makers and also sat on various 
ministries’ dairy committees. With the credibility and contacts to communicate evidence, he could be 
considered a ‘policy champion’. This role demonstrates the importance of a single credible policy 
champion, who is able to draw on broader collaborative networks. 
 
Conversely, some individuals in key positions acted as barriers to change for a long time. But SDP 
effectively countered the effects of this through their multiple approaches – working with partners to 
support grassroots pressure, and bypassing individual blockers through the avenues opened up by 
advocacy partners. 
5.1.7 Right timing 
Prior to the arrival of the new NARC government in December 2002, Kenya’s political system was largely 
unresponsive to change. Had SDP had to fight the so-called ‘Milk War’ within the political context 
before December 2002, the outcome might have been different or it might have taken much longer to 
achieve the desired change of policy. After 2002, there was a change in Kenyans’ perception of the 
government. The new government was expected to be more accommodating to the needs of ordinary 
Kenyans, including those in the informal sector, which meant that they were no longer as afraid of 
voicing their concerns. In general, there was a change in citizen voice in the policy process in 
Kenya which enabled the general public to show their support to informal dairy marketers through the 
mass media. There was also a significant change in the level of influence that CSOs could have in the 
policy process, so that the SDP decision to involve CSOs in the advocacy process gave more leverage in 
SDP’s efforts to change the policy towards the informal milk marketers. Once again, the continuous 
feeding of findings on the sector before these later advocacy activities was very important in starting 
the process of changing mindsets. Active advocacy for change much earlier than it was done may have 
met with a different outcome. The combination of these factors contributed to speeding up the process 
of policy change. 
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5.1.8 External factors 
In the beginning of SDP Phase III, SDP staff were reluctant to accept the new project objective which put 
more emphasis on policy advocacy. Most SDP staff were researchers and therefore felt somewhat 
uneasy at being involved in policy advocacy to gain greater impact of their research results. But as 
DFID focused more clearly on ‘policies, institutions and processes’, putting greater emphasis on 
the political context, they required SDP staff to do the same. As well as encouraging this change of 
approach, they also gave support to achieving it, notably through supporting the DFID APO position. 
Without this influence, it is likely that SDP would have been less active in its engagement in policy 
influencing, and change in policy towards informal milk marketers might not have been the focus of the 
project. 
5.1.9 Focus on incentives 
An overarching lesson that SDP and its partners learned and applied was to look at the incentives of 
key players, especially politicians and those close to them. The response of key people in the policy 
process depended as much on how much personal political gain they would achieve, as it did on the 
evidence itself. This is a complex area, and researchers cannot be expected to be experts in political 
issues. However, politicians live or die by the vote, and demonstrating how change is in the popular 
interest seemed to help balance the pressure on politicians from private interests. As a result of change 
in attitude in response to the evidence, KDB are now perceived as pioneers of a new model of a dairy 
industry, which responds to the needs of the majority, as opposed to an organisation that acts only in 
the interests of the large-scale formal sector. The lesson from this is to look carefully at how a policy 
change affects key people’s personal interests. If there is a conflict, come up with a strategy to address 
it; if they are aligned, then take advantage and highlight the political gain. 
5.2 Lessons on the Rapid Outcome Assessment (ROA) approach 
As mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 2, this study used a methodology called Research and Policy 
in Development Outcome Assessment (RAPID Outcome Assessment or ROA) as a combination of the 
elements of three well-established methodologies adopted by the PPPPPC project.  
 
One significant contribution that the ROA method can offer is its ability to map the cause and effect of 
key events, and to map the contribution of each of the key actors. By doing so it is possible to address 
the problem of attribution to a certain extent. Therefore, it is vital to have representatives of the key 
actors in the workshop so that they can describe exactly what the role was of each key actor and their 
contribution to each key event. 
 
Individual discussions and interviews with various key players to triangulate, clarify, and verify the data 
and information collected in the workshop were highly important in gaining understanding about 
background information of key events. They were also important tools for gaining a good understanding 
of the project time line – provided each interview was carefully planned. The wrap-up meeting at the 
end of the study with project staff was beneficial in focusing on the findings of the study and for 
understanding the expectations of the results of the study. 
 
In sum, although this was the first time that the ROA methodology was used, and it was therefore more 
demanding than a familiar methodology would have been, it seems to have been a useful tool to 
collect and analyse data on SDP’s policy impacts.  
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Appendix 1: Research and Policy in Development Outcome 
Assessment (ROA) 
ROA was designed as a learning methodology to assess the contribution of a project’s actions and 
research on a particular change in policy or the policy environment. It is a flexible, visual tool that can 
be used to map changes in the project and its environment, and it can be used in conjunction with 
other evaluation tools and methods to evaluate a particular project or programme.  
 
The key steps of the ROA were originally designed as follows: 
1. Describe the policy environment at the end of the project; 
2. Describe the policy environment at the beginning of the project; 
3. Identify the key policy actors or agents of change; 
4. Within the agents of change, identify the boundary partners that are conducive to the change or 
that influence the policy environment; 
5. Describe the behaviours of the boundary partners that are conducive to a change in the policy 
environment or policy; 
6. Describe the behaviours of the boundary partners at the beginning of the project; 
7. Map the key changes in behaviour for each boundary partner from the start of the project; 
8. Map the key changes in the internal environment of the project including organisational changes, 
outputs and changes in behaviour during the same period; 
9. Map the external influences including the actions of strategic partners and other exogenous factors 
during the same period; 
10. Determine the level of impact/influence of the project on the changes in behaviour of the boundary 
partners; 
11. Determine the level of impact/influence of external influences on the changes in behaviour of the 
boundary partners and the project; 
12. Refine the conclusions with in-depth interviews and assess the real contribution of the project to 
the policy environment; 
13. Write report. 
 
The intention was that steps 1 to 11 could be covered in a workshop with key stakeholders to produce a 
table similar to Figure 4 below. 
 
However, after some discussions with SDP researchers, concerns were raised about the ability of some 
workshop participants less exposed to training methodologies to understand the ROA methodology 
and to follow the discussion. It was decided that the initial workshop with SDP related staff and 
advocacy CSOs would not follow the steps described above rigidly. Instead, various participatory 
training techniques were used to collect the information needed to complete the expected output of 
ROA. 
 
  
54 
Figure 4: Example of Research and Policy in Development Outcome Assessment (ROA) Output 
 
 
 
In the SDP workshop, the following steps were actually carried out: 
1. Description of the policy environment at the beginning and the end of the project. Participants were 
asked to write on cards what they thought had changed in the smallholder dairy sector in Kenya in 
the last few years. The cards were then organised into following categories: organisational change, 
policy change, practical change and behavioural change.  
2. An introduction to the Smallholder Dairy Project. A presentation about the history, organisation and 
activities of the SDP was given by the original project manager from MoLFD.  
3. Identification of SDP project time line, policy context and external factors. Participants were divided 
into groups:  
o Group 1 (SDP Staff) developed a project time-line and identified the key events and changes;  
o Group 2 (Other participants) were asked to develop a ‘rich description’ of the policy context for 
smallholder dairy production in Kenya currently and in 1996; and to identify any key external 
events which influenced how the policy context for smallholder dairy production has changed. 
4. Identification of key players. Participants were asked to name all the key players in the 
development of the smallholder dairy sector in Kenya. They were then asked to select the three that 
they thought had had the most impact on the smallholder dairy sector, and to write the reasons 
why on a coloured card – yellow for their first choice, green for their second choice and blue for the 
third choice. A score was calculated for each stakeholder where a yellow card equalled three 
points, a green card two points and blue cards one point.  
5. Description of key actor behaviour. Participants were divided into groups to consider specific 
groups of stakeholders and wrote on cards their behaviour now, their behaviour in 1996, and key 
points when their ‘behaviour and attitudes’ changed in between. On the back of those cards, they 
wrote why they thought that behaviour change happened, and what impact they thought that the 
change had had on others. The cards were then pinned to the wall. 
6. Participants were then asked to look at all the factors on the wall and see if they could see any links 
between them. Each link identified was connected using a piece of string and the reason was 
noted. A copy of the cards and links was projected via PowerPoint onto another wall. There was not 
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enough time to complete this activity on the second day; a smaller group completed the map the 
following day. 
7. Identification of issues to be followed-up in the interviews with key players. 
 
In the end, the workshop was able to produce a table similar to the example above and important 
information about the project was gathered. 
 
From the process of applying ROA in the workshops, some useful findings and experiences should be 
noted: 
• It is very important to know in advance exactly who will be participating in the workshop, their 
background, their expectations, their relationship with the project and their agendas (if any) as this 
will help smooth the facilitation process and enable better planning of workshop activities. 
• The participants should remain the same throughout the workshop – people who are not available 
to attend for the whole duration of the workshop should not be invited as it will delay the progress 
of the workshop and disrupt the small group discussions. 
• It is important that all participants understand the concepts of policy, behaviour and attitude to be 
able to accurately identify changes in policies. The facilitator should ensure the participants 
understanding before moving on to the next activity. 
• Involving the project staff in the planning of the workshop and also involving them in the 
facilitation process is very useful for focusing the activities better and to gain ‘insights’ into 
participants statements and comments, thus enabling a better understanding of the project. 
• Better workshop planning needs to be done to avoid a long plenary discussion, especially in 
identifying links between key events. The background of each participant should be collected so 
they can be grouped into different criteria of key actors and asked to discuss the links in small 
groups. It would be useful for one group to discuss the link between the project and external 
environment with the key events, and the other group to discuss links between other key actors 
and the key events. Another idea is to give three sets of strings to each participant: blue for direct 
effects from the project; green for effects from the key actors; and red for effects from the external 
environment. Participants are then asked to use the strings to link two key events and note why 
they think there should be a link. The result should then be discussed in a plenary session. 
• Writing a daily report and having it available for the next day of the workshop is very useful in 
focusing the discussion on the second day because the participants can refer to the results of the 
discussions from the day one. 
 
Through this case study ROA was proven to be beneficial for: 
• Developing a project time line 
• Identifying the key actors and the role they played in specific key events and their interaction with 
SDP and other key players 
• Identifying changes overtime  
• Identifying external influences  
• Identifying the project behaviour  
• Describing behaviour changes 
• Identifying ‘hotspots’ (a key event which leads to many other key events or when various key events 
added up to one major event) 
• Establishing cause and effect between various key events (to certain extent) 
• Identifying issues to follow up 
 
However, the ROA was not effective for: 
• Describing what actually happen within each of the key events  
• Identification of the environment surrounding a specific key event 
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Appendix 2: Policy Impact Workshop, 22-25 February 2005, Kenya 
For information on the workshop programme and notes, please see the webpage at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Events/ILRI_workshops/docs/Workshop_2_notes.pdf. 
 
 
Participants (Facilitators: Cokro Leksmono, John Young, Dannie Romney) 
 
• Amos Omore, ILRI, SDP 
• Julius Nyangaga, ILRI, SDP 
• Henry Magara, Strengthening the Informal Sector Training and Enterprise, (previously with MoLD in 
Kiambu) 
• Margaret Wambugu, ILRI, SDP and KDDP 
• Lucy Chege, MoLFD, Kiambu 
• Josephine Kirui, Land O’Lakes 
• Steve Ashley, UK Consultant, the IDL Group (doing the final project review of SDP, also facilitated 
the SDP 2001 log frame workshop) 
• Rachel Sila, Public Health Officer, MOH Muranga 
• H.G. Muriuki, ex MoLFD and SDP 
• Nick Hooton, former DFID Associate Professional Officer working with SDP 
• Professor Arimi, University of Nairobi, Department of Veterinary Medicine 
• Professor Gangethe, University of Nairobi, Public Health 
• Gabriel Karanja, Milk Trader, Thika 
• George Gichungu, DLPO, Thika 
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Appendix 3: List of Interviewees 
Name  Job Title Date of Interview 
Dr. William Thorpe ILRI, Regional Representative, Asia (Current, 
previously SDP Field Manager) 
15th December 2004 
Dr. Dannie Romney Researcher MOSD 20th December 2004 
Dr. Nick Hooton DFID APO 12th January 2005 
Mr. H.G.M. Muriuki SDP project Manager 1997-2003 Various occasions 
Mr. Machira Gichohi Managing Director, Kenya Dairy Board 21st and 25th February 2005 
Mrs. Immaculate A. Odwori Principal Import/Export Officer, Kenya 
Bureau of Standards 
19th February 2005 
 Ministry of Co-operative Development 19th February 2005 
Mr. Richard Matengi  Local Council Public Health Officer, Thika 20th February 2005 
Mr. Gitungu District Livestock Officer, Thika 20th February 2005 
Mr. Peter Karanja 
Ms. Virginia Amaida 
Ms. Anijoke Kamara 
Mr. Gabriel Karanja 
Mr. Joseph Kamani 
Ms. Grace Jaydi 
Ms. Margaret Wanjiko 
SSMVs, Thika 20th February 2005 
Mr. Mahul Jayantilal Shah Chairman of the Dairy Processor Association 
of Kenya 
28th February 2005 
Mr. Harun N. Baiya and Ms. 
Mary Mwangi 
Chief Executive and Programme Officer, 
Strengthening Informal Sector Training and 
Enterprise (SITE) 
1st March 2005 
 
Mrs. Joyce Kiio Technical Officer, Kenya Dairy Board 2nd March 2005 
Ms. Heike Hoeffler and Mr. 
Joshua Inoti 
Agricultural Policy Advisor and Programme 
Officer, Promotion of Private Sector 
Development in Agriculture (PSDA) 
2nd March 2005 
Mr. Simon Sale KDB Branch Manager, Kisumu 5th March 2005 
Mrs. Mildred Kosgey KDB Branch Manager, Kericho 5th March 2005 
15 Traders Self-help group members from Nakuru 6th March 2005 
Mr. Gem C. Argwings-Kodhek Researcher, Tegemeo, University of Egerton 7th March 2005 
Mr. Cheruiyot Head of Planning, Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries Development  
7th March 2005 
Dr. John Omiti Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Policy 
Analysis and Research 
7th March 2005 
Mr. Elkanah Odembo Director, Ufadhili (Think Tank) 8th March 2005 
27 Traders SSMVs, Murang’a 9th March 2005 
9 Traders SSMVs, Machakos 10th March 2005 
Mr. Eric Schmidt Managing Director, Tetra Pak Limited, Kenya 11th March 2005 
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Appendix 4: The RAPID Framework 
What influences research to policy uptake? 
Often, the link between research and policy, or evidence and practice, is viewed as a linear process, 
whereby a set of research findings or lessons shift from the ‘research sphere’ over to the ‘policy 
sphere’, and then has some impact on policy makers’ decisions and practical programmes. Reality 
tends to be much more dynamic and complex, with two-way processes between research, policy and 
practice, shaped by multiple relations and reservoirs of knowledge.  
 
The traditional question ‘How can research be transported from the research to the policy sphere?’ has 
been replaced by a more complex question: ‘Why are some of the ideas that circulate in the 
research/policy networks picked up and acted on, while others are ignored and disappear?’. 
 
ODI’s theoretical, case study and practical work has identified a wide range of inter-related factors, 
which determine whether research-based and other forms of evidence are likely to be adopted by 
policy makers and practitioners. These factors can broadly be divided into three overlapping areas: the 
political context; the evidence; and the links between policy and research communities, within a fourth 
set of factors: the external context. The interplay of these four areas is laid out in Figure 5. The 
framework should be seen as a generic, perhaps ideal, model. In some cases there will not be much 
overlap between the different spheres; in others the overlap may be considerable. 
 
Figure 5: The RAPID framework 
 
Political context: politics and institutions  
Research-policy links are dramatically shaped by the political context. The policy process and the 
production of research are in themselves political processes from start to finish. Key influencing factors 
include: the extent of civil and political freedoms in a country; political contestation, institutional 
pressures and vested interests; and the attitudes and incentives among officials, their room for 
manoeuvre, local history, and power relations. 
 
In some cases the political strategies and power relations are obvious, and are tied to specific 
institutional pressures. Ideas circulating may be discarded by the majority of staff in an organisation if 
those ideas elicit disapproval from the leadership. 
 
Evidence: credibility and communication 
Our findings and experience suggest that the quality of the research is important for policy uptake. 
Policy influence is affected by topical relevance and, as importantly, the operational usefulness of an 
idea; it helps if a new approach has been piloted and the document can clearly demonstrate the value 
of a new option. A critical issue affecting uptake is whether research has provided a solution to a 
problem. The other key set of issues here concern communication. The sources and conveyors of 
evidence, the way new messages are packaged (especially if they are couched in familiar terms) and 
targeted can all make a big difference. For example, marketing is based on the insight that people’s 
reaction to a new product or idea is often determined by the packaging rather than the content in and 
political context 
evidence links 
Politics and 
policymaking 
Media,  
advocacy, 
networking Research, 
learning and 
thinking 
External Influences   
Socio-economic and  
cultural influences, 
donor policies 
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of itself. The key message is that communication is a very demanding process and it is best to take an 
interactive approach. Continuous interaction leads to greater chances of successful communication 
than a simple or linear approach. 
 
Links: influence and legitimacy 
Third, our work emphasises the importance of links; of communities, networks and intermediaries (for 
example, the media and campaigning groups) in affecting policy change. Some of the current literature 
focuses explicitly on various types of networks, such as policy communities, epistemic communities, 
and advocacy coalitions. While systematic understanding remains limited, issues of trust, legitimacy, 
openness and the formalisation of networks have emerged as important. Existing theory stresses the 
role of translators and communicators. It seems that there is often an under-appreciation of the extent 
and ways that intermediary organisations and networks impact on formal policy guidance documents, 
which in turn influence officials. 
 
External influences 
Finally, a synthesis of the RAPID experience emphasises the impact of external forces and donors 
actions on research-policy interactions. While many questions remain, key issues here include the 
impact of international politics and processes, as well as the impact of general donor policies and 
specific research-funding instruments. Broad incentives, such as EU Accession or the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, can have a substantial impact on the demand for research by 
policy makers. Trends towards democratisation and liberalisation and donor support for civil society 
are also having an impact. Much of the research on development issues is undertaken in the North, 
raising concerns of relevance and beneficiaries’ access to the findings. A substantial amount of 
research in the poorest countries is funded by international donors, which also raises a range of issues 
around ownership, whose priorities, use of external consultants and perceived legitimacy. As policy 
processes become increasingly global, this arena will increase in importance.  
 
For a synthesis of the main conclusions of recent ODI work in this area, see the RAPID Briefing Paper 
available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Publications/Documents/rapid_bp1_web.pdf. 
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